2014 Supreme(Guj) 937
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others - Petitioners
Versus
V.M. Vasant - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 85 of 2014
Decided On : 08-07-2014
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Palak H. Thakkar, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Amrita M. Thakore, Advocate.
Headnote:
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – General Insurance Business (Notification) Act, 1972, Section 16(1)(g) – Appellant-original defendant has preferred this Second Appeal challenging judgment and decree of Additional District Judge, dismissing the said Appeal, in turn, confirming judgment and decree of Joint Civil Judge(J.D.), in Regular Civil Suit – Held, order of termination has to be treated as penal in nature – form of the letter of termination or formal expression of language therein , did not matter, when in substance, it was found to be a penal character and on the foundational facts a stigmatizing one – concurrent finding recorded by both the courts below was cogent and convincing, when they held that the order of termination was illegal and in breach of natural justice – Appeal dismissed
JUDGMENT :
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
1. The appellant-original defendant-United India Insurance Company Ltd. has preferred this Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging judgment and decree dated 30th September, 2013 of learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No. , 109 of 1996, dismissing the said Appeal, in turn, confirming judgment and decree dated 7th June, 1996 of learned 4th Joint Civil Judge(J.D.), Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Suit No.1038 of 1982.
1.1 Both the Courts below held that the order of termination of services of the respondent-original plaintiff, a Probationary Development Inspector, working with the appellant company, was illegal and violative of principle of natural justice.
2. The plaintiff in his Civil Suit prayed for declaration and permanent injunction that the order dated 20.10.1982 passed by the Regional Manager of the appellant company was illegal and further to restrain the defendants from implementing the said order and terminating his services.
3. The plaintiff came to be appointed as Development Officer by letter of appointment dated 12.06.1980. As per the conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment, he was placed on probation for 12 months. The conditions inter alia further provided that the period of probation was extendable for further 12 months. It was also a condition that as a Probationary Development Officer, he was expected to yield a general premium income of at least Rs.75,000/- in the 1st year, and for the subsequents years as may be fixed by the management. The plaintiff completed the probation period and also further 12 months on 15.06.1982. It was the case of the plaintiff that as per the conditions, he was given work for Rs.95,000/- , upon completion of above total period, as against for Rs.75,000/- earlier given. It was contended by the plaintiff that the termination of his services sought to be effected by order dated 20.10.1982 was illegal and was passed behind his back for alleged misconduct and in breach of natural justice.
3.1 The defendants filed written statement at Exh.12 and contested the Suit. It was contended that the plaintiff was not confirmed and the appellant company had right to take action against any of its employees, when requires. It was further contended that the plaintiff opted to help out insured person even after the accident took place and put the company to loss. It was stated that an explanation was also asked for in that regard from the plaintiff. It was then contended that the services of the plaintiff was terminated in terms of clause 10 of the appointment letter. The Trial Court framed issues at Exh.27 and decreed the Suit. The finding of the Trial Court that the allegations were levelled against the plaintiff, for which, no departmental inquiry was conducted and his services came to be abruptly terminated without compliance of natural justice was confirmed by the First Appellate Court, culminating into the impugned judgment and decree in this Second Appeal.
4. Learned advocate for the appellants Mr. Palak H. Thakkar vehemently assailed the judgments of the Courts below and submitted that the order dated 20.10.1982 was a simple termination pursuant to clause 10 of the letter of appointment. He submitted that as , per the said clause, the appellant was liable to be terminated at any time by giving one months notice or months salary in lieu without assigning any reason, and thus, status of the plaintiff was temporary. He submitted that the termination was not punitive, as sought to be made out.
4.1 Learned advocate for the appellants relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [AIR 1958 SC 36]. Referring to paragraph 26, 27 and 28 of the said judgment, he contended that the plaintiff had not acquired any right to continue in service. He further contended that where a person is appointed to a permanent post on probation, termination of his services during