JUDGMENT :

1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was initially filed for quashing and setting aside the order of termination dated 20.05.1996, the order dated 26.02.2009 and also to quash and set aside the 18.12.2017 on the ground that the last order dated 18.12.2017, discharging the petitioner from service was not in consonance with the directions issued by this Court in a previous petition. Consequently, the petitioner also prayed for reinstatement into the service with all consequential benefits like continuity in service, promotion, full back-wages and all the benefits as if the petitioner had continued in service of the respondent-bank.

2. On account of development pending the petition, the petitioner has sought amendment of the prayer clause and by way of amending the petition, who had attained the age of superannuation on 02.06.2021, prayed for payment of gratuity, PPF, accumulated leave encashment as per rules and regulations and commutation of monetary benefits to which an employee of the respondent bank would be entitled upon retirement. The petitioner has also claimed that from the date of his discharge till the date of superannuation, the petitioner be treated as an employee and be paid all the salary and allowances with 9% interest. The case of the petitioner is that the petition who was appointed with the respondent-bank as Cashier-Cum-Clerk on 01.03.1986, prior thereto, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner for offence under Sections 324, 114 of the Indian Penal Code, which later on culminated in to conviction of the petitioner. On account of such conviction brought to the notice of the respondent-bank, the respondent-bank passed an order, terminating the service of the petitioner. Such order was passed on 20.05.1996. This order was subject matter of challenge in a petition being Special Civil Application No.9517 of 2009, which came to be disposed of by oral judgment dated 20.09.2017 by which the order of the respondent-bank was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded back to the respondent-bank to re-examine the case of the petitioner in light of the observations made by this Court.

3. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the respondent-bank did undertake the procedure of rehearing the petitioner however, ultimate order passed by the Court was not in consonance with the directions given by this Court in its oral judgment dated 20.09.2017. It is submitted that the order impugned now before this Court is dated 18.12.2017, wherein the bank has invoked Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (for short “the Act”) which, as submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner, was held to be an afterthought by this Court. Attention is drawn to observation made by this Court in para-21 of the oral judgment dated 20.09.2017 in Special Civil Application No.9517 of 2009, wherein the observation is made that the show-cause notice and the impugned order of discharge as well as the appellate order were silent about the suppression of registration of the offense and therefore, such contention raised in the aforesaid petition by the learned advocate for the respondent-bank was liable to be rejected. However, the respondent authority, while passing the impugned order in the year 2017, has once again invoked the same issue and on the basis of suppression of the conviction from the bank being an act of moral turpitude, passed the impugned order.

3.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had served the respondent-bank for a long period and during this time, there is nothing on record to indicate that there was any lapse in his duties or that he has conducted in a manner which would amount to an act against moral turpitude. The act, if any, which is alleged against the petitioner, cannot be termed to be an act of moral turpitude, but the act which is not within the scope of duty of the petitioner. The petitioner was