The petitioners in these cases, have challenged the constitutionality of a legislation called the Assam Taxation (On Goods carried by Roads or Inland Water-Ways) Act, being Act 13 of 1954. It is claimed for the State that the Act is well with­in its legislative competence under the powers vouchsafed to the State Legislature by virtue of Art. 246(3) read with entry 56, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The attack on the legislation is directed on various grounds. It is contended that it contravenes Art. 301 of the Constitution and thus violates what the peti­tioners call their guaranteed right of free trade, commerce and intercourse in the 'territory of India.

It is also urged that the Act infringes their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution: that the legislation is discrimina­tory in character and is hit by Art. 14; and that it is an unauthorised encroachment on entry 52 of entry 84 of List I, the Union List. I may ob­serve at the outset that most of the important submissions of Mr. Iyengar, who has addressed the leading argument for the petitioners, are covered by my decision in "Atma Ram Budhia v. State of Bihar', AIR 1952 Pat 359 (A), a Special Bench decision in which my other two colleagues almost entirely concurred.

I find that the above decision has been quot­ed with approval by Rajainannar C. J. sitting with another learned Judge in a recent case of 'P. Mathurai Filial v. State of Madras', AIR 1954 Mad 569 (B), where a similar legislation a9 the one in instance was in question. I do not how­ever claim infallibility for my judgment and I would have gladly revised my views if in the varied and versatile presentation of the subject by Mr. Iyengar I had found anything substantial to deflect me from the opinion which I then held. I regret to say that after giving my anxious con­sideration to all his arguments I have nothing to that effect.

(2) It is idle to repeat what I said in my ear­lier judgment. It is well known that in deciding about the validity of an impugned legislation, the real test is whether in pith and substance, the Act falls under an authorised legislative Field. If it does, then the mere fact that incidentally or in its ancillary effect it trenches union some other legislative fields also will not invalidate the legis­lation the pith and substance doctrine is not new. It is now too well established by successive authoritative judicial pronouncement to have any repetition. There is a large volume of decisions on the point both English and Indian.

My knowledge goes back to the eighties of the last century when in - 'Russel v. R.'. (18:821 7 AC 829 (C), the principle of "the true nature and character of the legislation", or, what is called, "the pith and substance of the legislation" wag early enunciated. Ever since then, the principle has hold the held in nil matters of statutory interpretation and helped many an impugned legis­lation to survive the test of judicial scrutiny. I have no desire to encumber this judgment with a reference to all those earlier decisions, but it appears to me necessary to consider just a few of the latest pronouncements on the point.

In 'Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales', (1950) AC 235 (D), Lord Porter when delivering the opinion of the Judicial Commi­ttee of the Privy Council in an appeal from the Com­monwealth of Australia quoted the famous dic­tum of Lord Watson in - 'Salomon v. Salomon and Co.', (1897) AC 22 at p. 38 (E):

"In a Court of law or equity, what the Legis­lature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication."

His Lordship then proceeded to observe thus:

"The same idea is felicitously expressed in an opinion of the English law officers Sir Roundel Palmer and Sir Robert Collier cited by Isaacs J. in - 'James v. Crown', 43 CLR 386 at p. 409 (F): "It must be presu