Point of Law: Even the contention that there is discrimination and provisions of Clause 9.3.2 and 9.3.3 is violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India, is without any basis.

JUDGMENT :

(R.M. Chhaya, J.)

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment & order dated 25.10.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.7723/2016, the original petitioner/ appellant has preferred this intra-Court appeal.

2. The following facts emerge from the record of this appeal. The appellant is the younger sister of Late M. Guruloo, who was working with Coal India Limited as a permanent employee and expired while in service on 25.07.2002. As per the record, Late M. Guruloo was survived by his wife, son and brother. It is the case of the appellant that Late M. Guruloo took divorce from his wife, Mrs. M. Jyoti, in Title Suit (Divorce Case) No.22/1996. It is further the case of the appellant that Late M. Guruloo executed a Will in favour of the appellant and bequeathed all his property to the appellant. According to the appellant, the appellant obtained a Probate Certificate from District Judge, Tinsukia in Probate Case No.139/2002. It is further the case of the appellant that the appellant is entitled to all benefits as dependant of the deceased M. Guruloo, who was an employee of the Coal India Limited. According to the appellant, the son of Late M. Guruloo is not interested in getting an employment in Coal India Limited and, therefore, the appellant should be accommodated.

3. As per the record, the appellant issued a legal notice through her advocate, Shri B.N. Dubey, to the respondent Coal Company demanding to provide her employment in place of her late brother M. Guruloo and also to pay pension as per the Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998. The said notice was replied by the General Manager (P) of North Eastern Coalfields on 03.03.2015 informing the appellant that as the appellant is the sister, she is not entitled to get monthly pension. It is also the case of the appellant that the appellant again approached the respondent Coal Company with a request to reconsider the issue and further issued a legal notice for the second time on 08.02.2016.

4. The said notice was again replied by the Coal India Limited with a communication dated 11.06.2016 informing that she is not entitled to any benefit. According to the appellant, as per Clause 9.3.3 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA), sister is included in the word “dependant” and further relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors. -Vs- Ram Rakhi, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 560, it was contended that the widowed sister is included in the term “family” for claiming family pension and, therefore, she would be entitled to the benefits, as prayed for.

5. In the writ petition, the respondent filed an affidavit-in-opposition before the learned Single Judge and contended that the appellant has made an attempt to mislead the Court inasmuch as that the fact that the appellant is a married daughter of Shri M. Appalswami would not be entitled to compassionate appointment or compensation. Denying the contentions raised by the appellant, it was contended by the respondent Coal India Limited that the appellant has already been paid the money receivable by her brother including provident fund dues by the respondent authorities solely on the basis of probate obtained by her, which was also obtained without notice to the son of Late M. Guruloo. It is also contended by the respondent authorities that in fact the son of Late M. Guruloo applied for compassionate appointment on attaining majority on 20.02.2012, i.e. after almost 10(ten) years, and the same was rejected on ground of delay, which has not been challenged by the son of the respondent.

6. The learned Single Judge after considering the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the parties and examining the provisions of Chapter – IX of NCWA, more particularly, Clauses 9.3.2 and 9.3.3, came to the conclusion that the said provision excludes sister of the deceased employee whether married or unmarried and, therefore, the appellant would not be entitled to an