JUDGMENT :

Heard Mr. S. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. S. Sarma, the learned counsel representing the respondent.

2. This is an application under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the judgment and order dated 24.06.2014 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.2, Kamrup(M) in Misc. Arb. Case No.9 of 2006 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant.

3. The appellant Union of India is represented by the Chief Engineer, Project Dantak, C/O. 99 APO and the respondent is a private limited company.

4. On the basis of an agreement between both sides, the respondent was given the task of designing and erection of six bridges on Indo-Bangladesh border roads under project Dantak in the State of Meghalaya. Out of the six bridges, for five of them, there was a stipulated construction time of 270 days. It was not done accordingly and therefore, an extension of time of 159 days was given. Even within that time period, the construction of the bridges could not be completed. There was further extension of time given to the respondent. In fact, the respondent had taken a total of 1258 days against original stipulated time period of 270 days.

5. For the aforesaid reasons, according to the terms of the agreement, the appellant levied a compensation of Rs.7.5 lakhs upon the respondent as compensation and it was recovered from the respondent’s bill.

6. Thereafter, the respondent took the matter for arbitration. The Arbitrator directed the appellant to refund the sum of Rs.7.5 Lakh to the respondent.

7. The appellant approached the court of the Addl. District Judge, Kamrup under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and the learned appellate court agreed with the respondent and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present application has been filed before this Court.

8. I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides.

9. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is based on Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the scope of the provisions for setting aside the award is far less than it was under the Sections 30 or 33 of the 1940 Act. The new Act was brought into being with the express Parliamentary objective of curtailing judicial intervention. Section 34 significantly reduces the extent of possible challenge to an award.

10. Section 34 provides that an arbitral award may be set aside by a court on certain grounds specified therein. These grounds are :

1. Incapacity of a party

2. Arbitration agreement not being valid

3. Party not given proper notice of arbitral proceedings

4. Nature of dispute not falling within the terms of submission to arbitration

5. Arbitral procedure not being in accordance with the agreement

11. Section 34(2)(b) mentions two more grounds which are left with the Court itself to decide whether to set aside the arbitral award :

1. Dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitral process

2. The award is in conflict with the public policy of India.

12. Thus the powers of the court U/S. 34 is limited and courts should not expand their own powers granted by the statute. Any such attempts by the courts while exercising their powers under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall frustrate the purpose of the above said Act itself.

13. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. V. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. (2012) 1 SCC 594 it was held that a Court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating evidence and an award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) and in the absence of any such ground it is not possible to re examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.

14. Deliberating upon the phrase “public policy” as referred to in section 34 of the Act, in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. [1994 Supp. (1) SCC 644], considered Section 7(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 which inter alia provi