The judgment emphasizes the need for impartiality and fair trial, and discusses the reasonableness of the apprehension of bias affecting the decision.

JUDGMENT :

Heard the learned senior counsel Mr. D. Das appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. M. Phukan, the learned Public Prosecutor, Assam.

2. This is an application under Section 407 of the CrPC seeking transfer of the Special Case No.05/2021 pending in the court of the Special Judge, Assam to any other equivalent court.

3. The petitioner has been facing trial in a case under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, after spending 5 years and 7 months in judicial custody. After closure of recording of prosecution evidence, the petitioner wanted to examine defence witnesses under Section 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To that effect, the petitioner wanted some time. The trial court provided only 3 hours’ time. The petitioner wanted more time but the court refused to grant more time.

4. The petitioner apprehended that the court was biased towards him and he would not get fair and impartial justice in that court. Therefore, the petitioner filed this present application under Section 407 of the CrPC praying for transferring the case from the court of Special Judge, Assam to any other equivalent court.

5. The learned counsel Mr. Das has submitted that the prosecution was allowed so many years to produce prosecution witnesses and the accused/petitioner was given only three hours’ time to submit the list of defence witnesses. The learned counsel has termed this act of the trial court to be an act of bias.

6. In order to buttress his point, Mr. Das has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770. Paragraphs 28, 29, 31 and 36 of the said judgment are quoted as under:

“28. The principle in these cases is derived from the legal maxim—nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa. It applies only when the interest attributed is such as to render the case his own cause. This principle is required to be observed by all judicial and quasi-judicial authorities as non-observance thereof is treated as a violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide Rameshwar Bhartia v. State of Assam [(1952) 2 SCC 203 : AIR 1952 SC 405 : 1953 Cri LJ 163], Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar [AIR 1960 SC 468] , Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen [AIR 1963 SC 1719] and Transport Deptt. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar [1988 Supp SCC 651 : AIR 1988 SC 2232] .)

29. The failure to adhere to this principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the Judge. The question is not whether the Judge is actually biased or, in fact, has really not decided the matter impartially, but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. (Vide A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat [(2009) 11 SCC 84 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 567] and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. [(2010) 10 SCC 539 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 180] )

31. The test of real likelihood of bias is whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely and whether the adjudicator was likely to be disposed to decide the matter only in a particular way. Public policy requires that there should be no doubt about the purity of the adjudication process/administration of justice. The Court has to proceed observing the minimal requirements of natural justice i.e. the Judge has to act fairly and without bias and in good faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality, is a nullity and the trial coram non judice. Therefore, the consequential order, if any, is liable to be quashed. (Vide Vassiliades v. Vassiliades [AIR 1945 PC 38], S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P. [(1974) 3 SCC 459 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 580] and Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1].)

36. Thus, it is evident that the allegations of judicial bias are required to be scrutinised taking into consideration the factual matrix of the case in hand. The court must bear in mind that a mere gr