The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the principles of limitation, particularly the interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the need for a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach in condoning delay.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard. Shri S. Hoque, learned counsel for the applicant, who, by means of this application, has prayed for condonation of delay of 497 days in preferring the connected appeal against' a judgment and award dated 31.7.2018 passed in MAC Case No. 16/2015 by which an amount of Rs. 5,70,000 has been granted.

2. By the aforesaid order, the learned Tribunal has directed that though the amount would be paid by the Insurance Company, the same could be recovered from the owner, as there was violation of the policy conditions.

3. Shri Hoque, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that vide an initial order dated 12.5.2016, the matter had proceeded ex parte and that order is also challenged in this appeal. The learned counsel submits that as all along in the Tribunal, he was not aware of the case and long after, he had come to know about the case, the present appeal has been filed in which process, the delay has been caused. He, accordingly submits that a huge liability has been saddled with the applicant and, therefore, he may be given a scope to contest the same on merits.

4. Shri K.K. Bhatta, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company, however, submits that the delay is an inordinate one and. not properly explained and, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed.

5. As per the Office Note dated 16.12.2021, service upon the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 is complete so far as usual process is concerned.

6. It is a settled principle that the law relating to limitation is required to be interpreted in a pragmatic and justice oriented approach so that technicalities do not stand as a hurdle in the way of substantive justice. At the same time, one also cannot wholly overlook the requirement of limitation. As the objective of the Legislature is to bring litigation to an end and the power to condone the delay has to be exercised in a judicious manner. The aspect of a right being accrued to the contesting party after expiry of the limitation cannot also be brushed aside lightly.

7. Under those principles, let us examine the present case.

8. The limitation prescribed for preferring an appeal against an award of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is 90 days which, in the instant case, was on or up to 14.3.2017. The appellant, however, had preferred the review before the learned Tribunal on 21.6.2017 and the review was rejected on 24.5.2018. In the aforesaid process, delay of about 340 days had occurred.

9. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 lays down as follows:

“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.— (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, “whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or oilier cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.

Explanation. — For the purposes of this section,—

(a) in excluding the time during which a