ORDER

1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, arguments are heard finally.

This Miscellaneous Appeal at the instance of the appellants/claimants under section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is directed against the impugned award dated 5.12.2015 passed in Claim Case No.193/2013 by VIth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Satna (MP).

2. Heard on I.A. No.4317 of 2023 – an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in presentation of the appeal.

3. The appeal is barred by 2552 days i.e. almost 7 years & 3 months.

4. I have gone through the application for condonation of delay.

5. Learned counsel for appellants/claimants has submitted that the award was passed on 5.12.2015 and the appeal for enhancement was required to be filed within 90 days from the date of award; but same could not be filed in due time as appellant No.1 Chhaya Shivhare Wd/o Late Shri Kamal Kishore Shivhare is a poor lady and she has to support her minor children after the death of her husband. After passing the impugned award, she could not understand what to do; her financial condition is not good and she did not have any knowledge about the Law. When she came to know from her well-wishers that she can challenge the impugned award before the Hon’ble High Court by filing the Misc. Appeal, then she came to Jabalpur and contacted to the Lawyer for filing the Misc. Appeal. It is submitted that there is a delay of almost about a period of 7 years & 3 months (in total 2552 days) in presentation of the present misc. appeal. The delay caused in filing the appeal is bonafide and unintentional as circumstances were beyond the control of the appellants, therefore, appeal was drafted in March, 2023 and ultimately, the appeal was filed on 17.3.2023. Thus, it is prayed that the delay caused in presentation the appeal may be condoned.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/Insurance Company has vehemently opposed the application by filing reply to the application for condonation of delay and has argued that there is no justification or satisfactory reason disclosed on day to day basis explaining the delay on the part of the appellants/claimants. The appellants have not been able to show the sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, therefore, the application for condonation of delay as well as the appeal deserve to be dismissed.

7. I have learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.

8. Law with regard to scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act is well settled by Hon’ble the apex Court and the various High Courts.

9. In the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.; AIR 1962 SC 361, Hon’ble the apex Court has held as under:-

“7. In construing section 5 (of the Limitation Act), it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.”

10. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, Hon’ble the apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by LRs. v. Executive Enginner, Jalgaon Medium Project and another; (2008) 17 SCC 448 has held as under:-

“26. Basically, the laws of limitation are founded on public po