The main legal point established in the judgment is the limited power of the court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside an arbitral award and the prohibition on re-appreciating evidence. The judgment emphasizes the need for minimal interference and the grounds justifying interference, such as commission of misconduct by the arbitrator.

This is an Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Act of 1996’) challenging the order dated 25.01.2018 passed in Misc.(J) Case No.135/2014 whereby the application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was rejected.

2. Before proceeding on the facts leading to the filing of the instant Appeal, this Court finds it relevant to take note of that Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is a power conferred upon the Court to set aside an arbitral award. It is well settled by various judgments of the Supreme Court that the power under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 conferred upon the Court is limited on the grounds specifically enumerated in Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The constricted powers under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 upon the Civil Court to interfere with an arbitral award is for the reason that when the parties have chosen to avail an alternative mechanism for dispute resolution, they must be left to reconcile themselves to the wisdom of the decision of the Arbitrator and the role of the Court should be restricted to the bare minimum. Interference would be justified only in the cases of commission of misconduct by the Arbitrator which can find manifestation in different forms including exercise of legal perversity by the Arbitrator. It is also well settled by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. vs. Cromton Greaves Limited, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 1 that arbitral award should not be interfered with a causal and cavalier manner, unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed that an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has to be differently approached and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. It was further observed by the Supreme Court in the said decision that the mandate under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.

3. The Supreme Court further in the case of UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 116 categorically observed that when it comes to the scope of an Appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all more circumscribed.

4. In the backdrop of the above proposition of well settled principles, let this Court takes into account the instant Appeal for adjudication. The facts as could be seen from the materials on record shows that the respondent herein was an investor who opened a Trading and Demat Account with the respondent Company through its sub-broker one Swapna Rani Paul at Margherita. It was alleged in the statement of claim by the respondents that the said business on behalf of the sub-broker was being managed and looked after by one Swarup Paul, her son. The respondent purchased certain shares in the market through the trading member during 2011-12 and 2012-13 and made full payment thereof and these stocks were lying in the Demat Account opened by the respondent with the trading member. It was alleged by the respondent that without his consent, authority and information, the sub-broker carried out transactions in respect of the stocks of the respondent. On enquiry, it could be learnt that the value of the majority of the shares of the respondent kept in the Demat Account were wiped off due to huge trading loss which the respondent did not consent the sub-broker to indulge in. Under such circumstances, the respondent demanded the settlement o