Drunkenness does not absolve murder liability; intention to kill is assessed based on evidence, including circumstantial evidence of injuries indicating guilt.

JUDGMENT :

M. Zothankhuma, J.

1. Heard Mr. L.R. Mazumdar, learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. R.R. Kaushik, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State respondent. 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgement dated 10/06/2022 passed by the Court of Learned Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur, in Sessions Case No. 140(NL)/2019, by which the appellant has been convicted under section 302 IPC for killing his wife. The sentence order dated 13/06/2022, by which the appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default, rigorous imprisonment for one month, has also been put to challenge.

3. The facts of the case, in brief, is that an FIR dated 08/05/2019 was submitted by the Prosecution Witness-3 (PW-3), who is the mother of the appellant, to the effect that her son (appellant) had always been creating disturbance by assaulting her and her daughter-in-law (deceased) for about one month, under the influence of Alcohol and Ganja. On 08/05/2019, at around 10 a.m., the appellant confined his wife (daughter-in-law) in the house and assaulted her with a wooden batten, causing grievous injury on her entire body. Her daughter-in-law was taken to Laluk Hospital by the local people. However, as her injuries were grievous in nature and her condition was very critical, she was sent to North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital for better treatment. However, her daughter-in-law died in North Lakhimpur Civil Hospital at about 4-30 p.m.

4. Pursuant to the FIR, Laluk P.S. Case No.173/2019 under Section 302 IPC was registered.

5. PW-10 was made the Investigating Officer (IO) and after investigation of the case, PW-10 filed a charge sheet, having found a prima facie case under section 302 IPC against the appellant.

6. The learned Trial Court framed charge under section 302 IPC, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The learned Trial Court examined 11 Prosecution Witnesses and after examination of the appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C., the learned Trial Court came to a finding that the appellant had killed his wife.

7. The learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant submits that there are no eye witnesses to prove that the appellant had killed his wife. He also submits that the evidence of the daughter of the appellant and the deceased, i.e. PW-4, who was studying in Class-IV, does not show that PW-4 had witnessed the appellant killing his wife. He submits that even if it is assumed that the appellant had killed his wife, there was no intention on the part of the appellant to kill his wife, inasmuch as, they were drunk and in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. The State of Pepsu [AIR 1956 SC 488], intention has to be gathered from the attending general circumstances of the case, paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. He thus submits that if the appellant is to be considered to be fully intoxicated, intention to kill may not be there. Learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant further submits that there is only a presumption and suspicion that the appellant had killed the deceased. However, suspicion cannot take the place of proof. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam [ (2013) 12 SCC 406 ]

8. Mr. R.R. Kaushik, learned APP, Assam, on the other hand, submits that the appellant and the deceased were last seen together and that their daughter had seen them fighting. Thereafter, the deceased had been seen in an injured condition. As such, the evidence of PW-4 is a relevant fact forming part of the circumstantial evidence that the appellant had beaten up his wife, which led to her death. Further, under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving as to how the deceased had died was especially within the knowledge of the appellant, which the appellant failed to discharge. As the injuries sustained by