Under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an executing court is restricted to determining the executability of a decree and cannot go behind it. A decree is challengeable as a nullity only if lacking inherent jurisdiction; mere legal or factual errors do not render it unenforceable.

JUDGMENT :

KAUSHIK GOSWAMI, J.

1. Also heard Mr. B.K. Sen, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

2. The present revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), is directed against the Judgment and Order dated 04.01.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) No. 2, Cachar, Silchar in Misc. Appeal No.09/2019. By the said judgment the Appellate Court affirmed the order dated 15.11.2019, passed by the learned Munsiff No.2, Cachar, Silchar in Title Execution Case No.5/2014, whereby the application filed under Section 47 read with Section 151 of by the judgment debtor was rejected.

3. The lis originates from Title Suit No.164/2007, instituted by the respondent seeking ejectment of the predecessor of the present petitioners. The suit was initially dismissed ex-party by Judgment and Decree dated 19.02.2011. However, in Title Appeal No.16/2011 the First Appellate Court by Judgment and Decree dated 21.04.2014, reversed the Trial Court’s decision and decreed the suit.

4. The said Decree was put to execution in Title Execution Case No.5/2014 (New No.59/2014). During execution the predecessor of the petitioners filed an objection petition under Section 47 CPC, contending that the decree was inexecutable on the ground of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction. The Executing Court rejected the objection, holding that it could not go behind the decree. The Appellate Court affirmed the same.

5. Mr. S.D. Purkayastha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity, having been passed without jurisdiction. It is urged that the Appellate Court wrongly applied the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, although the tenancy pertained to land, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. It is further contended that the issue stood concluded in earlier proceeding and is barred by res judicata.

6. Per-contra, Mr. B.K. Sen, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the plea of default had already been conclusively determined in Title Suit No.112/2004 which attained finality. It is argued that the Executing Court cannot re-examine such findings and no jurisdictional error has been demonstrated warranting interference under Section 115 CPC. In support of his submissions, he relies upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Periyammal (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. Vs. V. Rajamani & Anr., 2025 (0) Supreme (SC) 461 and in the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) through his LRs., (1990) 1 SCC 193.

7. I have given my due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing for the contending parties and have perused the materials available on record. I have also duly considered the case laws cited at the Bar.

8. The issue that arises for determination is whether the Executing Court was justified in rejecting the objection under Section 47 CPC, and whether the impugned decree suffers from any jurisdictional infirmity so as to render it a nullity.

9. The scope of interference under Section 47 CPC is well settled. An Executing Court cannot go behind the decree and is bound to execute it as it stands, unless the decree is shown to be i) a nullity; ii) ambiguous; or iii) passed without jurisdiction.

10. In the case of Brakewel Automotive Components (India) (P) Ltd. v. P.R. Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 SCC 371, the Apex Court reiterated that powers avail