The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the bonafide need for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, considering the impact of subsequent events and the requirement of the landlord and family members.

N.K. Balakrishnan, J. The tenant is in revision. The landlord who retired from CRPF sought eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act contending that he bonafide needs the petition schedule building for starting a stationery business for eking out the livelihood of himself and his family members as he has no other source of income other than the pension he gets. The tenant contended that the need projected is not bonafide. The Rent Control Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties ordered eviction of the revision petitioner under Section 11(3) of the Act. His appeal, RCA No.14/2005 was dismissed.

2. The tenant contends that subsequent to the dismissal of the RCA, the landlord expired and so the need does not survive. According to the revision petitioner the subsequent event ie; the factum of death of the original landlord has to be taken into account and as there is no evidence to show that the need was for family members as well, order of eviction cannot be sustained.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and respondent at length.

4. Whether the death of the landlord long after the dismissal of RCA would be sufficient to non suit the respondents (the LRs of the original landlord) is the short question that falls for consideration in this revision. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Seshambal v. Chelur Coporation [2010(1) KLT 834 (SC)] to buttress his submission that subsequent events have also to be taken into account. That was a case where the Rent Control Petition was filed by the landlords, the husband and wife. During the pendency of the revision before the High Court, the landlord- husband passed away leaving his wife, Seshambal. Seshambal, who was the appellant before the Apex Court passed away during the pendency of the appeal. Hence, her 3 daughters sought substitution as legal heirs of the appellant. It was found that one daughter was living with her family at Coimbatore and another daughter in Bihar. The third daughter was settled in America. Relying on the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770], Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [(2002) 2 SCC 256], Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103] and Baba Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Gavali [1994 Supp (3) SCC 698], it was held that the Court could take note of the subsequent events. The eviction petition in that case was totally silent about the requirements of any member of the family of the owners-petitioners. Neither before the Rent Controller nor before the Appellate Authority it was argued that the requirement in question was not only the requirement of the landlords but also the requirement of any other member of their family whether dependent upon them or otherwise. The specific case put forward in that case was that of the deceased-widowed owner of the demised premises and not of any member of her family. The fact situation in that case is entirely different from the facts obtained in this case. In Hasmat Rai's case it was observed by the Apex Court that if the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement of the landlord no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the court, including the Appellate Court, has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate upon the same. In the decision in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram [1992 Supp (2) SCC 623] it was held : "The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequ