C.T. Ravi Kumar, J.

1. This bunch of cases viz., Criminal Revision Petitions filed by the convicts who faced prosecution and Criminal Miscellaneous Cases filed by the accused who are facing prosecution, for offences under different Sections of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, "P.F.A. Act") read with different rules of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955 (for short, "P.F.A. Rules"), relating to food adulteration were placed before us on orders of reference. All the Crl. M.Cs. except Crl. M.C. No. 2755/2013 were referred as per order dated 25.9.2014 and all the other cases including Crl. M.C. No. 2755/2013 were subsequently referred based on the order of reference dated 25.9.2014. Apparently, the order of reference dated 25.9.2014 was made in the wake of cleavage of opinion and divergent findings made by three learned Single Judges regarding the ratio decidendi in the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Food Inspector, 2010 (4) KLT 706 (SC), in different cases. The questions referred to the Division Bench are as follows:

"(1) Could all the prosecutions under the Act of 1954 be stifled by raising a contention that the laboratories or methods of analysis were not defined?

(2) Is it proper to hold that since Central Government has not taken steps to effectuate S. 23(1A) (ee) and (hh) of the Act of 1954, no prosecution will lie under the Act of 1954 even if it is established that the standards prescribed for various food items have been flouted?

(3) Whether the ratio in Pepsico's case (supra) can be applied to all cases of alleged food adulteration under the Act of 1954 irrespective of the fact whether or not standards have been prescribed for food items?"

Before answering the reference, it has become inevitable for us to consider another question of importance which could decide the width of jurisdiction while deciding the captioned cases received on reference. The question is whether a learned Single Judge could refer only one or some of the questions that arise/arises for consideration to the Division Bench and retain the case for consideration in questions not referred, but involved in the referred case. In fact, that question is no more res Integra in view of the decisions of a Division Bench of this Court in Kallara Sukumaran v. Union of India, 1987 (1) KLT 226 and a larger Bench of this Court comprised of seven Honourable Judges in Babu Premarajan v. Supdt. of Police, 2000 (3) KLT 177 (F.B.). As a matter of fact, those decisions were also considered by the learned Single Judge while passing the order of reference dated 25.9.2014.

2. While dealing with the power of a Single Judge under S. 3 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (for short, "the Act") in contradistinction to the powers of a Division Bench under S. 4of the Act, in Kallara Sukumaran's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held thus:-

"lt is clear from S. 3 of the Act that a Single Judge is empowered to adjourn the case for being heard and determined by a bench of two Judges. S. 3 does not confer any power on the Single Judge to refer only one of the questions that arises for consideration to the Division Bench. S. 4 of the Act, on the other hand, makes it clear that a Division Bench can refer the entire case or a question of law to a Full Bench. If the legislature intended to confer power on a Single Judge to refer only a question of law to the Division Bench, it would have made a specific provision to that effect as has been done in S. 4 of the Act. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that a Single Judge is not competent to refer only a question of law to the Division Bench. The Single Judge, can, if he so desires. refer the entire case to the Division Bench. (emphasis added)

In Babu Premarajan' case (cited supra) the Larger Bench held as follows:

"When a single Judge adjourns the case for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Judges under S. 3 of the Act, he passes a judicial or