IMPORTANT POINTS
• Immunity from eviction enjoyed by the bank under the provisions of the Act is not lost on account of the statement made by the counsel for the bank in the Court that the premises would be surrendered immediately on construction of currency chest in another building.
• Even if there was an undertaking given by the counsel on behalf of his client, the undertaking should be carefully construed to find out the extent and nature of the undertaking actually given by the person concerned. It is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertaking when there is none on the record-The Senior Counsel for the bank had not given any undertaking before the Court that the premises shall be vacated within four months or within any specific time.

R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, J.

1. The first appellant is a nationalised bank. The second appellant is the Assistant General Manager of the bank. The bank is the tenant of the building owned by the respondent.

2. The respondent filed W.P.(C) No.17866/2017 against the appellants seeking the following reliefs:

“(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to surrender vacant possession of the petitioner's premises covered by Exhibit P-1 lease deed, within a reasonable period of time;

(ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the Chairman and Managing Director to the respondents to consider Exhibit P-14 representation and pass appropriate orders on it in accordance with law and the policy of the respondents, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard;

(iii) Issue such other directions that this Honourable Court may deem fit and expedient, to meet the ends of justice, in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

3. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by directing the bank to surrender vacant possession of the building occupied by it to the respondent within four months from the date of the judgment. The aforesaid judgment is under challenge in this appeal.

4. We have heard Sri.George Cherian, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the appellants and also Sri.E.K.Nandakumar, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the respondent.

5. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the writ petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable. He would contend that no direction could be issued by this Court to a tenant, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to surrender vacant possession of the building occupied by him to the landlord. He would contend that, while issuing the direction, the learned Single Judge has omitted to take into consideration the bar contained in Section 11(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')

6. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent has contended that, when the writ petition came up for hearing, the counsel who appeared for the bank had submitted that the bank was ready to surrender possession of the premises to the respondent and it was on the basis of such undertaking that the writ petition was disposed of. He has submitted that the appellants cannot now turn around and contend that the writ petition filed was not maintainable.

7. The respondent purchased the building occupied by the bank with the land appurtenant thereto on 30.11.2015. The lease agreement had been entered into between the bank and the then owners of the building. After the respondent became the owner of the building, the appellant had paid the rent of the building to the respondent and she had received it. The period of the lease expired on 31.12.2016. Thereafter, the respondent had informed the bank that she was not willing to renew the lease.

8. There is a plea raised in the writ petition that, after the expiry of the period of lease, the status of the bank was that of a tenant at sufferance. There is no merit in this plea. The Act is a special statute governing and regulating tenancy. The provisions of the Act supersede the general law of tenancy (See Ram Saran v. Pyare Lal : AIR 1996 SC 2361). Section 2(6)(ii) of the Act recognises the principle of holding over, by including in the definition of tenant "a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour". This provision is incompatible with Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the status of the bank, after the expiry of the period of lease, is that of a tenant by holding over.

9. It is stated in the third paragraph of the impugned judgment as follows:

“3.The learned Senior Counsel for the Bank pointed out that the Bank has now located a suitable premises, and negotiations a