IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JJ.
Abdul Khader S/o Kannathuveettil – Appellant
Versus
Rapheal T. George S/o Thekkekkara Joseph George – Respondent
FAO No. 17 of 2023
Decided On : 27-06-2023
Fact of the Case:
The appellant sought to set aside an ex parte decree and filed applications invoking provisions under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The lower court dismissed these applications.Finding of the Court:
The Court allowed the appeal by setting aside the lower court's order and directed it to reconsider the applications and pass a reasoned order.Issues:
Whether there was sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or making an application within the prescribed period.Ratio Decidendi:
The concept of "sufficient cause" for non-appearance must be construed with respect to when the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex parte. A liberal approach should encapsulate reasonableness but not be unfettered.Final Decision:
The appeal was allowed, and the lower court's order was set aside. Both parties were directed to appear before the Sub Court for further proceedings.JUDGMENT :
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J.
1. The appellant is the 1st defendant in O.S.No. 44 of 2015, which was one filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein, against the appellant for realisation of a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-, together with interest and cost. In that suit, the defendants were set ex parte and an ex parte decree was also passed on 05.01.2017. Seeking an order to set aside that ex parte decree, the appellant- 1st defendant filed R.P.I.A.No. 20 of 2022, invoking the provisions under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, along with I.A.No. 1 of 2022, which is an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking an order to condone the delay of 2110 days in filing the former application. Those applications ended in dismissal by the common order dated 23.12.2022 for the reasons stated therein. The said order is under challenge in this appeal filed invoking the provisions under Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. On 29.03.2023, when this appeal came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file. The respondents entered appearance through counsel.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-1st defendant and also the learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs.
4. The reasoning of the court below in the impugned order dated 23.12.2022, for dismissing the applications, reads thus:
5. The Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted by the Parliament to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. Section 5 of the Act deals with extension of prescribed period in certain cases. As per Section 5, any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As per Explanation to Section 5, the fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Section.
6. It is well settled that the Law of Limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that the parties to a litigation do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek legal remedy without delay. In an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court has to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown. Adopting a liberal approach in condoning the delay is one of the guiding principles, but such liberal approach cannot be equated with a licence to approach the court-at-will disregarding the time limit fixed by the relevant statute. The acts of negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Therefore, in the matter of condonation of delay, sufficient cause is required to be shown, thereby explaining the sequence of events and the circumstances that led to the delay.
7. In Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, in the context of Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963, the Apex Court held that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts
Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji
Collector, Land Acquisition vs. Katiji
Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar
Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy
G.P. Srivastava vs. R.K. Raizada
In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation
In considering applications for condonation of delay, courts must assess whether sufficient cause has been demonstrated based on events leading to the delay.
Under Order IX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure, court has to find out whether erring party has made out sufficient cause for setting aside ex-parte decree.
The court reaffirmed that substituted service under the Code of Civil Procedure does not constitute adequate service, necessitating substantiation of claims in applications for condonation of delay.
The court emphasized that the sufficiency of the cause for delay, rather than its length, is the key criterion for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Law of Limitation is founded on public policy to ensure that the parties to a litigation do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek legal remedy without delay and in an application filed under Sectio....
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