Point of law: while construing a legal provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the rule of literal construction, and other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear.

JUDGMENT :

The petitioner has approached this Court being aggrieved by the fact that the 3rd respondent (the competent authority for land acquisition under the National Highways Act, 1956) has determined that the petitioner, as well as respondents 5, 6 and 7 and late Mukundan, are entitled to share the amount of compensation awarded for acquisition of certain lands under the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1956 Act’).

2. The facts relevant for the adjudication of the lis may be briefly noticed. The writ petitioner and respondents 5, 6 and 7 are siblings. Late Govindan had seven children, including the petitioner and respondents 5, 6 and 7. In terms of Ext.P1 Will executed by late Govindan, the right of administration of a school, which belonged absolutely to late Govindan, was given exclusively to the writ petitioner. There is a clause in Ext.P.1 Will that if the petitioner were to sell the school or part with the property, the amount received by the petitioner shall be shared between the petitioner and all his siblings, including respondents 5, 6 and 7. While the petitioner contends that the amount received as compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land need not be distributed to any of his siblings, respondents 5, 6 and 7 contend that they are entitled to a share in terms of Ext.P.1 Will. The parties do not dispute that if the terms of the Will require the distribution of the compensation amount to all the children of late Govindan, the claim of respondents 5, 6 and 7 cannot be more than 3/7 shares jointly or 1/7 shares individually.

3. Sri.T.Krishnan Unni, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that the terms of the Will clearly indicate that the rights of respondents 5, 6 and 7 would arise only in the event of a sale of the school as such and not in a situation where the property is the subject matter of acquisition by the State in exercise of the power of eminent domain. It is submitted that, in any event, the claim of respondents 5, 6 and 7 could not have been adjudicated by the 3rd respondent and should have been referred for adjudication by the competent civil court under Section 3H(4) of the 1956 Act. It is his submission that even if the claim of respondents 5, 6 and 7 is accepted, each of the legatees under Ext.P.1 Will would be entitled to 1/7 shares in the amount of compensation as children of Late Govindan and therefore the share of compensation payable to the petitioner and other legatees who have agreed that the petitioner is entitled to the compensation can be paid to the petitioner. It is submitted that since a portion of the school building has also been acquired, funds are urgently required for the purpose of repair and construction of new buildings for the use of the school.

4. Sri. C.E Unnikrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 5, 6 and 7, would vehemently contend that even in a case of acquisition, respondents 5, 6 and 7 are entitled to payment of compensation together with the petitioner and even where compensation is received owing to the acquisition of land, the same must be treated as a case where the stipulations in clause (3) of Ext.P1 Will will apply. It is submitted that while respondents 5, 6 and 7 have no objection to the matter being referred for adjudication under Section 3H(4) of the 1956 Act, no portion of the compensation can be paid to the petitioner at present. It is submitted that the provisions of Section 3H(4) do not permit the reference of a part of the dispute. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar & ors v. District Magistrate, Mau & ors, 2023 SCC Online SC 787 in support of this contention.

5. Having heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the National Highways Authority of India, I am of the view that the dispute between the petitione