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2024 Supreme(Ker) 1105

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
GOPINATH P., J.
M/s. N.N. Steel Trading Co., Represented By Its Proprietor Shri Ameer Ali Ub - Petitioner
Versus
The Joint Commissioner (Appeals), Central Tax, Central Excise and Customs & Ors. - Respondents
WP(C) No. 35471 of 2024
Decided On : 22-10-2024

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner: Aji V. Dev, Alan Priyadarshi Dev, S. Sajeevan.
For the Respondent: V. Girishkumar (SR.SC).

The interpretation of 'month' in legal contexts refers to calendar months, impacting limitation periods for appeals.

Headnote:

Limitation - Appeal - Section 107 of CGST/SGST Acts - The court interpreted 'month' as a calendar month, allowing the appeal within the condonable period.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner challenged the rejection of their appeal by the First Appellate Authority, which claimed it was barred by limitation under Section 107 of the CGST/SGST Acts.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the interpretation of 'month' in Section 107 should be based on calendar months, thus the appeal was filed within the permissible time frame.

Issues: Whether the appeal was filed within the limitation period as defined under Section 107 of the CGST/SGST Acts.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that 'month' refers to a calendar month, not a fixed 30-day period, aligning with the Supreme Court's interpretation in previous judgments.

Result: The writ petition is allowed, and the appeal is restored for fresh consideration.

JUDGMENT :

Gopinath P., J.

The petitioner has approached this Court being aggrieved by the fact that an appeal filed by the petitioner against Ext.P1 order has been rejected by Ext.P3 order of the First Appellate Authority on the ground that it was barred by limitation under the provisions of Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax/State Goods and Services Tax Acts, 2017 (CGST/SGST Acts).

2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that Ext.P1 order was served on the petitioner on 06-07-2023. It is submitted that under Section 107 of the CGST/SGST Acts, a period of three months is available for filing an appeal, and an appeal can be presented within a further period of one month along with an application for condonation of delay. It is submitted that the appeal which resulted in Ext.P3 order of the First Appellate Authority was presented on 06-11-2023. It is submitted that the First Appellate Authority proceeded on the basis that the term ‘month’ in Section 107 of the CGST/SGST Acts referred to a period of 30 days in which event the appeal filed on 06-11-2023 was not maintainable. The learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Another v. Himachal Techno Engineers and Another; (2010) 12 SCC 120, to contend that if the word ‘month’ is used in any statute, the same can only be counted in British calendar months, and therefore, the appeal filed on 06-11-2023 was clearly within the condonable period mentioned in Section 107 of the CGST/SGST Acts.

3. The learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents does not seriously dispute the legal proposition as set out in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himachal Techno Engineers (supra).

4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, I am of the view that the issue stands covered in favour of the petitioner by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himachal Techno Engineers (supra), where while considering the question of whether an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, had been filed within time, the Supreme Court held as follows :

    “14. The High Court has held that “three months” mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Act refers to a period of 90 days. This is erroneous. A “month” does not refer to a period of thirty days, but refers to the actual period of a calendar month. If the month is April, June, September or November, the period of the month will be thirty days. If the month is January, March, May, July, August, October or December, the period of the month will be thirty one days. If the month is February, the period will be twenty-nine days or twenty eight days depending upon whether it is a leap year or not.

15. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act and the proviso thereto significantly, do not express the periods of time mentioned therein in the same units. Sub-section (3) uses the words “three months” while prescribing the period of limitation and the proviso uses the words “thirty days” while referring to the outside limit of condonable delay. The legislature had the choice of describing the periods of time in the same units, that is, to describe the periods as “three months” and “one month” respectively or by describing the periods as “ninety days” and “thirty days” respectively. It did not do so. Therefore, the legislature did not intend that the period of three months used in sub-section (3) to be equated to 90 days, nor intended that the period of thirty days to be taken as one month.

16. Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, defines a “month” as meaning a month reckoned according to the British calendar.

17. In Dodds v. Walker - (1981) 2 All ER 609 (HL), the House of Lords held that in calculating the period of a month or a specified number of months that had elapsed after the occurrence of a specified event, such as the giving of a notice, the gene

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