Civil contempt pertains to the High Court as an institution, not individual judges, and should be assigned according to the roster to ensure timely resolution.

ORDER :

(Nitin Jamdar, CJ.)

This suo motu petition is placed before us on the judicial side by the Registry under the roster assignment “suo motu matters in judicial practice and procedure" in view of the order dated 25 July 2024 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Cont. Case (C) No. 551 of 2024 and connected cases.

2. The Division Bench highlighted the delays in listing contempt cases, restoration petitions, time extension petitions, etc., when one among the Judges of the Division Bench retires, when the Judge who passed the order/judgment while sitting in Single retires or when both the Judges of the Division Bench are part of different Benches as per the Roster. We have passed a separate order regarding Restoration Petitions (MJC) and time extension petitions.

3. Presently, in this Court, Contempt Petitions are being placed before the same Bench or Judge who passed the original order. The Registry has highlighted that following such a procedure causes delays and the constitution of a special bench outside the Roster, thereby affecting the regular functioning of the court.

4. According to us, such a procedure is not warranted. No Rule mandates such a procedure. The order of a Judge or a Bench of this Court constitutes the order of the High Court. Breach and defiance thereof can amount to civil contempt. Civil contempt is defined under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as under:

“civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court, or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.”

Civil contempt thus encompasses wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.

5. In civil contempt cases, the reference is to the court and not a specific Judge or Bench. This legal position is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through its Registrar v. Raj Kishore and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 11. The learned Advocate General placed this decision on record in the written note. In this case, an appeal was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench had set aside the Rule which directed hearing of a petition alleging civil contempt by a learned judge to whom such work was assigned by the Chief Justice, who was other than the judge or judges who had passed the concerned order. The Division Bench took the view that once a Bench of the High Court has passed an order or direction, the breach of which is complained of by the aggrieved party, the same bench must hear the contempt petition. The appeal filed by the High Court was allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that this view was erroneous. Allowing the appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

“7. As per the aforesaid provisions of the Act the High Court can take suitable action in connection with civil contempt committed by the contemnor so far as the contempt is alleged to be in connection with any order passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. The contempt alleged is the contempt of the High Court as such and not necessarily the contempt of only a particular Judge who might have passed the order concerned in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court as such. “High Court” is defined by Section 2(d) of the Act to mean “the High Court for a State or a Union territory, and includes the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory”. The procedure for exercise of contempt jurisdiction can be laid down by the High Court concerned by framing suitable Rules under Section 23 of the Act.

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11. In the light of the aforesaid parameters of the powers of the High Courts as a superior court of record it is difficult to appreciate how