The court emphasized the necessity of prima facie evidence in domestic violence cases and upheld the Magistrate's findings on suppression of material facts.

ORDER :

G.GIRISH, J.

The common judgment rendered by the II^nd Additional Sessions Judge, Kozhikode, in Crl.A.Nos.174 & 175/2024 is under challenge in these revisions. The appellant in the above appeals was the petitioner in M.C.No.20/2023 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Kozhikode, a case filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (in short, ‘PWDV Act’). Before the learned Magistrate, the aggrieved person filed C.M.P.No.1081/2023 under Section 23(2) of the PWDV Act, seeking various interim reliefs of protection order, residence order, maintenance order etc. C.M.P.No.3955/2023 was filed by the aggrieved person before the learned Magistrate for getting back her original title deeds of property from the respondent. The learned Magistrate dismissed both the petitions stating the reason that the petitioner had suppressed material facts before the court, and hence the affidavit filed by her did not inspire confidence of the court to hold that a prima facie case of domestic violence is established. The Appellate Court found fault with the learned Magistrate for arriving at the conclusion that there was no prima facie evidence of domestic violence, before the commencement of evidence in the said case. The Appellate Court observed in the impugned common judgment that if there was no prima facie evidence of domestic violence, the petitioner cannot be considered as an aggrieved person under the PWDV Act, and hence the Trial Court ought to have dismissed the original petition itself as not maintainable. With the above observation, the Appellate Court remanded back C.M.P.Nos.1081/2023 & 3955/2023 to the learned Magistrate with the direction to have fresh disposal. Aggrieved by the above common judgment of the remand of the Appellate Court, the respondent in M.C. has filed these revision petitions.

2. The first petitioner before the learned Magistrate is a Dentist by profession. The respondent, her husband, is an Anesthetist. The petitioners 2 & 3 are the children born in their wedlock, who have now attained the age of majority. The first petitioner, admittedly, had been afflicted with cancer, and was undergoing treatment for the same. In addition to the allegations of physical and mental harassment, the first petitioner would contend that the respondent did not care to meet the expenses of her treatment or to provide financial assistance. It is on the basis of the aforesaid contentions that she approached the learned Magistrate with the petition under Section 12 of the PWDV Act. She also sought various interim reliefs as per the CMPs referred above. Relying on the records produced by the respondent, the learned Magistrate found that he had made payments for the treatment of the first petitioner, and also for the educational expenses of the petitioners 2 & 3. The learned Magistrate further observed that the first petitioner had suppressed the fact that she had commenced the functioning of a dental clinic in the year 2022, where she, along with seven other Doctors, have been working. The learned Magistrate also found fault with the first petitioner for not producing the account statements along with assets and liability affidavit to show that she was not having sufficient means to maintain herself. It is for the above reason that the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the first petitioner has resorted to suppression of material facts, and hence she was disqualified to seek the interim reliefs prayed for in the aforesaid C.M.Ps.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent, who is the revision petitioner herein.

4. The Appellate Court has not at all dealt with in its judgment about the reasoning adopted by the learned Magistrate for arriving at the conclusion that there was suppression of material facts on the part of the first petitioner. Nothing has been stated in the impugned common judgment of the Appellate Court as