The seizure of a vehicle for a forest offence does not require simultaneous action with timber; a reasonable timeline connection suffices.

ORDER :

1. This Division Bench is called upon to answer the question framed and referred to by the learned Single Judge as under:

“Whether the decision in Divisional Forest Officer v. Amina , 1999 (1) KLJ 433 and DFO, Kothamangalam v. Sunny Joseph , 2002 (3) KLT 641 express divergent views, and if so, whether a reference to a Full Bench is required?”

2. A few facts to provide context to the question referred are as follows. The Petitioner claims to be the owner of the vehicle which was taken into custody on 1 August 2024 by the Range Forest Officer on the allegation that it was used for illegal transportation of timber from the forest. The Petitioner moved the Court of Judicial Magistrate for interim custody of the vehicle. The Petitioner’s case is that he had nothing to do with the cutting or removal of timber and that he was not aware of its transportation. The Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-I, Thodupuzha, rejected the application for the interim release of the vehicle.

3. The Petitioner challenged this order by filing Crl.M.C. No.7505 of 2024 before this Court on the grounds that the Petitioner is innocent of the alleged crime, that the vehicle is currently lying idle, leading to deterioration in its value, and that the interim release of the vehicle ought to have been granted. The learned counsel for the Petitioner also contended before the learned Single Judge that, under Section 52 of the KERALA FOREST ACT , 1961 (the Act of 1961), a vehicle could be seized only if it was found transporting forest produce and since the vehicle was seized several days after the timber was seized, the seizure of the vehicle was bad in law. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Divisional Forest Officer v. Amina , 1999 (1) KLJ 433 . The learned Special Government Pleader for the Forest Department, on the other hand, placed reliance upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of DFO, Kothamangalam v. Sunny Joseph , 2002 (3) KLT 641 to contend that even if the vehicle is not seized simultaneously with the timber, it does not divest the Forest Officers to exercise the power conferred under Section 52 of the Act of 1961.

4. The learned Single Judge examined the decisions in the cases of Amina and Sunny Joseph, and opined that there could be a divergence of views between these decisions of the Division Benches and even though the subsequent decision had distinguished the earlier one, an authoritative pronouncement was necessary and that the matter needs to be considered by a Division Bench to decide whether the issue requires a reference to the Full Bench.

5. Pursuant to the administrative order, the reference is now placed before us to answer the above question.

6. We have heard Mr. Harkish Sreethu V.J., the learned counsel representing Mr. P. Shanes Methar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, and Mr. Nagaraj Narayanan, the learned Special Government Pleader.

7. The legal question arises from Section 52 of the Act of 1961. Section 52 of the Act of 1961 reads as under:

“52. Seizure of property liable to confiscation.- (1) When there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any timber or other forest produce, such timber or produce, together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing any such offence may be seized by any Forest Officer or Police Officer.

Explanation:- The terms ‘boats’ and ‘vehicles’ in this section, [section 53, section 55, section 61A and section 61B] s