Discretion in confiscation statutes requires courts to consider knowledge and culpability when determining liability of third parties involved in reclamation offenses.

JUDGMENT :

A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.

In quasi-criminal matters, ignorance of fact or lack of personal knowledge may be an immaterial defence. The proposition of the law in this regard is clear and followed at least from 1884 onwards, see opinion of the Queen's Bench in Cundy v. Le Cocq [(1884) 13 QBD 207], which we quote here:

“In some crimes a guilty mind is a necessary ingredient, but those crimes have now been defined, and so the old maxim has been superseded by the precise definitions of most crime, and, at the present day, whether a guilty mind is a necessary ingredient in any particular offence turns upon the words of each definition or of each statute.”

2. When the law and its enforcers fail to distinguish between the wicked and the blameless, justice becomes elusive, and the Court may inadvertently become complicit in the injustice. Though it is often difficult to adjudge each case in light of its unique facts and circumstances, the Court must nevertheless strive to adopt an approach that advances the ends of justice. In doing so, it may become necessary to invoke principles of fairness while interpreting a statute that accords some latitude for discretion—particularly where the impugned act is attributable to the will or choice of another. This would be impossible if statutory provisions did not provide for such discretion.

3. In the present case, we are examining an order directing the confiscation of an excavator allegedly used for reclaiming paddy land. We are in full agreement with the concerns expressed by the District Collector as well as with the submissions of the learned Government Pleader. Any act of conversion or reclamation of paddy land must indeed be viewed with utmost seriousness. At the same time, we cannot overlook the position of the owner of the JCB excavator, valued at Rs. 32,25,000/-, who appears to have been induced to undertake the work by the landowner. Nowhere in the proceedings is there any finding that the excavator owner, Mr. Venugopalan C., knew that the land was classified as paddy in the revenue records or the Data Bank.

4. As we noted, in quasi-criminal matters, mens rea may not be decisive, or ignorance of fact or absence of knowledge may not constitute a valid defence. The statutory provision authorises the District Collector to order confiscation of seized articles, including vehicles. Also, it provides an alternative by permitting payment of an amount equal to one and a half times the value of the seized property in lieu of confiscation. The difficulty in the present case does not lie in interpreting the statute. Rather, the statute does not distinguish between the landowner who uses a vehicle or article for illegal reclamation and a third-party contractor who merely hires out his vehicle at the behest of the landowner.

5. It is precisely in such circumstances that the modern statute ensures that the inherent value of fairness embedded in every legal provision is used to absolve the innocent. Accordingly, before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to frame the following questions:

5.i. Does the statute distinguish between the landowner who employs articles or vehicles for reclamation in contravention of the Act, and a third-party owner of such articles or vehicles who is merely engaged by the landowner?

5.ii. Does the statute confer any discretion to exonerate the owner of the vehicle or article from confiscation under Section 20 ? If the statute is silent regarding the differing roles of various persons involved, can individuals responsible for different acts or omissions be treated differently