IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
GOPINATH P., J.
D+H Solutions India Private Limited – Appellant
Versus
Jayakrishnan Ramachandran Nair, S/o K.N. Ramachandran Nair – Respondent
WP(C) NO. 38729 OF 2025
Decided on : 20-01-2026
JUDGMENT :
1. These writ petitions raise a common question as to whether a petition can be filed under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 19470 [Section 33 C (2) of the 1947 Act corresponds to Section 59 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020] (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1947 Act) without there being an independent adjudication of the claim by the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal. It is not disputed before me that the orders impugned in these writ petitions are orders on claim petitions filed under (2) of the 1947 Act without there being any prior adjudication before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. The question raised is no longer res integra in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court inMunicipal Corporation of Delhi v. Danesh Razak and others , (1995) 1 SCC 235 and Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and others , (2022) 5 SCC 629. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) the Supreme Court held as follows;
“8. Reference may be made first to the Constitution Bench decision in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan on which Shri Rao placed heavy reliance. That was a case in which the question of maintainability of proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act was considered in a claim made by the workmen on the basis of the Sastry Award. The employer disputed the claim of the workmen on several grounds including the applicability of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It was urged that since the applications involved a question of interpretation of the Sastry Award, they were outside the purview of Section 33-C(2) because interpretation of awards or settlements has been expressly provided for by Section 36- A. This objection was rejected. This Court pointed out the difference in the scope of Section 36-A and Section 33-C(2) indicating that the distinction lies in the fact that Section 36-A is not concerned with the implementation or execution of the award whereas that is the sole purpose of Section 33-C(2); and whereas Section 33-C(2) deals with cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen falling under its provisions, Section 36-A deals merely with a question of interpretation of the award where a dispute arises in that behalf between the workmen and the employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute deserves to be resolved by reference under Section 36-A. In this context, this Court also indicated that the power of the Labour Court in a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court is competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2), like the power of the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. Relevant extract from that decision is as under: (SCR pp. 154-155)
“Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court is given the power to allow an individual workman to execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of course, true that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour Court; but like the Executing Court, the Labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2). Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of making the necessary determination under Section 33-C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests.”
This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) extends to interpretation of the award or settlement on which the workman's right rests, like the Executing Court's pow
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Danesh Razak and others
Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and others
Under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court cannot adjudicate claims without prior recognition of entitlement; it can only enforce existing rights.
Section 33C(2) is more comprehensive than Section 33C(1). Section 33C(2) applies not only to cases of settlement or award or cases under Chapter VA of the Act, but to other cases as well. By a proces....
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Labour Court cannot entertain claim petitions and adjudicate the merits and demerits of the rights of the workman under Section 33(C)(2) o....
Section 33(C)(1) of I.D.Act deals with situation where money is due to a workman under a settlement or an award.
Claims under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be adjudicated if disputed; must first resolve through Industrial Dispute process.
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