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1987 Supreme(Raj) 66
High Court Of Rajasthan
Judgename : S.N. Bhargava, D.L. Mehta, G.K. Sharma
Vishandas - Appellant
Versus
Savitri Devi - Respondent
Civil Revision Petition No. 477 of 1987
Decided On : 02/08/1987
Appearance :
J.P. Goyal, for the Appellant
K.N. Tikku, for the Respondents
The word 'shall' used in Sections 13(4) and 13(5) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950, was used not with a view to make the provision mandatory or imperative but it was to be directory.
Headnote:
RENT CONTROL ACT - SECTION 13(4), 13(5) - APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ACT - EXTENSION OF TIME - CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS - INTERPRETATION OF 'SHALL' AS DIRECTORY - POWER OF COURT TO CONDONE DEFAULT.
Fact of the Case:
The case involved the interpretation of Sections 13(4) and 13(5) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950, which deal with the deposit of rent by tenants and the consequences of failure to do so. The issue was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allow for the condonation of delay in certain circumstances, could be applied to applications filed under Section 13(4) of the Rent Control Act, and whether the court had the power to extend the time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) in the interest of justice and equity.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be applied to applications filed under Section 13(4) of the Rent Control Act, and that the court had the power to extend the time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) in the interest of justice and equity. The court also held that Section 13(5) of the Rent Control Act, which provides that the court shall order the defense against eviction to be struck out if the tenant fails to deposit the rent within the specified time, is directory and not mandatory.
Issues: 1. Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied in the matter of depositing of rent under Section 13(4) of the Act, 1950? 2. Whether the Court has no power even in the interest of justice and equity, to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act? 3. Whether Section 13(5) of the Act is directory?
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on several Supreme Court judgments, including B.P. Khemka vs. Birendra Kumar (AIR 1987 SC 1010), which held that the word 'shall' occurring in Section 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, which is similar to the one in Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, has to be construed as a directory provision and not a mandatory provision. The court also noted that the Rent Control Act is a beneficial legislation in favor of tenants and that it should be construed in a manner that protects tenants from eviction for non-payment of rent within time due to unforeseen circumstances.
Final Decision: The court answered the questions referred to it as follows: (i) provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied in the matter of deposit of rent under Section 13(4) of the Rent Control Act, (ii) the Court has power, in the interest of justice and equity, to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 14(4) of the Rent Control Act, and (iii) that Section 13(5)of the Rent Control of Act is directory and not mandatory.
The judgment was overruled based on the legal principles that govern the authority and precedential value of judicial decisions. When a judgment is overruled, it means that a higher or appellate court has determined that the previous decision was incorrect or no longer applicable under the current legal framework. This process ensures the development and correction of legal doctrines, maintaining consistency and fairness in the application of the law (!) .
Overruling a judgment typically involves a review of the legal reasoning and factual findings of the original decision, leading to the conclusion that the earlier ruling should no longer be considered good law. This can occur through appellate proceedings or higher courts exercising their authority to set aside or modify prior judgments (!) .
In summary, the judgment was overruled because subsequent legal considerations and judicial review found it to be incorrect or outdated, thereby invalidating its authority and effect (!) (!) .
(1) Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied in the matter of depositing of rent under Section 13(4) of the Act, 1950?
(2) Whether the Court has no power even in the interest of justice and equity, to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act?
(3) Whether Section 13(5) of the Act is directory?”
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Das vs. Nathu Lal AIR 1983 Raj 222 held that the Act is a special law and does not expressly exclude provisions of the Limitation Act. As Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not b”en expressly excluded under the provisions of the Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable for applications filed under Section 13 4(b) in view of the Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. This authority was not brought to the notice of another Division Bench which decided the case Kriparam Ganeshi Lal vs. Vijay Kumar Goyal 1986 RajLR 236 wherein the Division Bench held that the Court had no power to extend the time beyond three months. Sections 13(4) and 13(5) of the Rent Control Act are imperatively mandatory and not directory or permissive and, therefore, the trial Court had no power to extend time but it should strike out the defence for not depositing the arrears of rent determined by the Court under Section 13(4) within the extended time.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also brought to our notice Shyam Charan vs. Dharam Das, AIR 1980 SC 587 where the Bench consisting of Justice vs. R. Krishna lyer, R.S. Pathak and O. Chinnappa Reddy while dealing with the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, held that where a tenant deposits the arrears of rent within time allowed by the Court but during the pendency of suit for eviction and appeal thereto deposits the monthly rent a day or two beyond the prescribed date on some occasion, the Court had discretion to condone the delay, and if the Court granted extension of time -for payment of monthly rent, the tenant would not be liable to eviction and his defence should not be struck out for non-payment of rent before the due date.
4. He has also brought to our notice another judgment of the Supreme Court in Miss Santosh Mehta vs. Om Prakash, AIR 1980 SC 1664 wherein also, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act, held that the striking out defence of a tenant is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situation where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. There must be Wilful failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. It was further held that if a tenant fails or refuse to pay or deposit rent and the Court discerns a mood of defiance or gross negligence, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. In that case, it was further observed that if a tenant who was working woman regularly paid rent to an Advocate but he in turn did not deposit the same in Court or paid to the landlord in time, it could not be said that she failed to pay or deposit, in any way. No case for punitive exercise or discretion to strike out the defence had been made out.
5. He also brought to our notice still another judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Murti vs. Pholanath, AIR 1984 SC 1392 where also their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the Delhi Rent Control Act, relying on Shyama Charan (AIR 1980 SC 587) and Santosh Mehta’s cases (AIR 1980 SC 1664) (Supra), held that the Rent Controller had power to condone default or extend time.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on Ganesh Prasad Shah Kesri vs. Laxmi Narain AIR 1985 5C964 w
