By the instant appeal, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘Act’), appellant has challenged order dated 24th of August, 2016, passed by the Addl. District Judge No.3, Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur (for short ‘learned Court below’). By the impugned order, learned Court below has disallowed the application of appellant-applicant-non-petitioner under Section 34 of the Act (Union of India Vs. M/s. Madan Mohan Jain & Sons & Anr.) and rejected the objections raised therein.

2. The facts, leading to the present misc. appeal, in nutshell, are that a contract was executed between respondent-contractor and the appellant Union of India in respect of extension of runway and the date of completion of work was upto 24.11.2006 but the work was completed at very slow speed on 26.08.2008 and final bill was paid on 26.09.2009 and the same is accepted with demure by the contractor. Later on, the contractor claimed payment as per rates prevailing at the time of completion of work and raised other disputes as such the matter was referred to the arbitrator. The sole Arbitrator after hearing both the sides, passed award dated 27.02.2012 against the appellant Union of India by partly allowing claim of the respondent-contractor. The Arbitrator while partly allowing the Claims No.1, 2, 3, 8, 13, 14 & 16 of the respondent-contractor awarded pendente-lite simple interest @10% per annum to be reckoned from 26th May, 2009. Further, the Arbitrator allowed appellant Union of India three months’ time to pay the award amount on or before 30th May, 2012 else the amount shall carry simple interest @12% per annum from 1st June 2012 and there shall be no future interest on the awarded amount and pendent-lite interest as per clause (a) of Para 166 of the award.

3. Feeling dismayed with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, appellant Union of India submitted application under Section 34 of the Act before learned Court below. In its application, assailing the arbitral award on various grounds, Union of India craved for setting aside the same on the anvil of grounds available under Section 34 of the Act. The application is contested by the respondent-contractor by submitting a brief reply. The application submitted on behalf of appellant Union of India did not find favour of the learned Court below and thus entailed its rejection by the impugned order.

4. The case set up by the appellant in the present appeal is that initially, the thickness of runway was 40 mm bitumen but later on it was changed to 155 mm bitumen polymer and the runway was required to be made in two layers; the base layer of 150 mm (wet mix macadam) and second layer of 44 mm bitumen considering the structural safety of the runway, which change was normal within the scope of Condition 7 of IAFW 2249 and the contract, and, accordingly, it was priced on the basis of Condition 62, and the price of polymer modified bitumen was arrived at on prorata rates for increasing thickness by 10 mm and for additional price for polymerization of bitumen, yet the contractor refused to accept the rates and raised dispute before Arbitrator on numerous points but the Arbitrator has not properly decided the matter taking into consideration the terms of contract and while exceeding its jurisdiction, in a partitioned manner passed the award in ignorance of condition No.7 of IAFW 2249 and against the pleadings of the appellant.

5. Mr. Sanjeet Purohit, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the appellant, has vehemently argued that the phrase “Public Policy of India” has a wide connotation but the learned Court below has failed to consider it in right perspective. Learned counsel would urge that Hon’ble Court has given expansive meaning to the fundamental policy of Indian law or the interest of India or justice or morality by broadening horizons but by construing the same narrowly, rendered the impugned order vulnerable. It is contended by Mr. Purohit that the core questi