The court cannot entertain a second application for the same purpose when a similar application has been rejected and has attained finality, especially at the stage of final hearing.

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Mehta, J. - The present misc. petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') is directed against the order dated 23.12.2021, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Kuchaman City, District Nagaur (hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court"), whereby petitioner's application dated 12.11.2021 under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been rejected.

2. The facts relevant for the present purposes are that on 08.06.2018, the respondent-complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the present petitioner before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Kuchaman City, District Nagaur alleging, inter-alia, that the accused handed over a cheque for the sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, which got dishonoured with the remark "account closed". The petitioner took a plea that the signature on the cheque in question was not hers.

3. In order to establish the same, the present petitioner moved an application dated 01.03.2021 under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which application was rejected by the learned trial Court vide its order dated 01.03.2021, while observing that the same was filed belatedly.

4. The case proceeded and then, the petitioner moved yet another application dated 12.11.2021 along with a report of the private handwriting expert dated 10.11.2021 and prayed that the same be taken on record and considered.

5. Learned trial Court rejected the said application vide order dated 23.12.2021 with a cost of Rs. 2000/-, inter-alia, observing that the said application has been filed at the stage of final argument and thus not maintainable, particularly when its earlier order dated 01.03.2021 has attained finality.

6. Mr. Mukesh Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Court below has erred in rejecting petitioner's application on the ground of delay, while submitting that the provision under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be invoked at any stage.

7. In support of his argument aforesaid, learned counsel relied upon the judgment dated 24.04.2008, rendered in the case of T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar reported in 2008 AIR (SC) 2010 and the judgment dated 17.07.2018, rendered in the case of Ramesh Sharma v. State of Raj. through PP reported in 2019 (1) NIJ 72 and argued that it was incumbent upon the trial Court to have sent the cheque for the opinion of a handwriting expert.

8. Heard.

9. Indisputably, an application under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 filed by the petitioner on 01.03.2021, had already been rejected by the trial Court vide its order dated 01.03.2021, against which the petitioner had filed a misc. petition, and the same was dismissed as withdrawn.

10. The petitioner has thereafter invoked provisions of Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code and requested the trial Court to summon the private handwriting expert.

11. In the opinion of this Court, when petitioner's earlier application for sending the cheque to handwriting expert for verification of the signatures has been rejected by the trial Court and the same has attained the finality, the petitioner's prayer to place opinion of private handwriting expert is nothing short of abuse of the process.

12. As, the order rejecting application under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has attained finality, the second application cannot be entertained, moreover when the case in question is at the stage of final hearing.

13. True it is, that an application under Section 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be filed at any time, but then, the Court cannot be oblivious of the stage of the proceedings. The Court has to bear in mind the subtle but significant difference between the expression 'Any time' and 'any stage'.

14. The application, as a matter of fact, has not been rejected on the ground of delay, but considering the stage of the proceedings.

15. So far as judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner a