The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of Section 21 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 2008, prescribe a maximum period of 90 days for filing an appeal against the order of a NIA Special Court, and the court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the 90-day period.

JUDGMENT

1. Appellant has preferred this criminal leave to appeal under Section 372/378(3) of Cr.P.C. aggrieved with the judgment dated 08.03.2017 passed by the Court Special Judge, NIA Cases in Sessions Case No. 2/2011.

2. It is contended by counsel for the appellant that the record was bulky and when it came to the notice of the appellant that State has not preferred an appeal against the acquittal of the accused in this case, he took copy of the order and without any delay he has preferred this leave to appeal. It is also contended by the counsel for the appellant that application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed along with the leave to appeal.

3. We have considered the contentions.

4. Section 21 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 2008 (for short ’the Act of 2008’) provides for appeal. The relevant provisions read as under:-

"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.’

(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:

Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days:

Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days."

5. A bare perusal of sub-Section (5) of Section 21 of the Act of 2008 clearly shows that the period for preferring an appeal against an order is 30 days from the date of judgment, sentence or order and High Court can after the expiry of the said period on sufficient cause extend the period, however, no appeal is permitted to be entertained after expiry of the period of 90 days. The Legislature in its own wisdom has prescribed a maximum period of 90 days for filing an appeal against the order of a NIA Special Court.

6. In Nasir Ahammed Vs. National Investigation Agency, Ernakulam, 2016 Crl.L.J. 1101, the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the issue as under:-

"The scope of the provisos to sub-section (5) of S. 21 of the NIA Act has to be considered in the light of the other provisions in the Act. The period of limitation provided under sub-section (5) of S. 21 is thirty days. The first proviso to subsection (5) empowers the High Court to entertain an appeal after the expiry of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. The second proviso provides that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days. The first proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 21 itself deals with condonation of delay in filing appeal and the delay up to sixty days (ninety days from the date of order) can be condoned by the High Court. By making a restriction that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days, the application of S.5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded. The High Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal. But that power is restricted under the first proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 21. A further restriction in the second proviso is a clear

indication that the High Court cannot exercise the power under S.5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. To that extent, it amounts to an express exclusion of S.5 of the Limitation Act as contemplated under S.29(2) of the Limitation Act.

For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the application for condonation of delay is not maintainable. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay as well the criminal appeal are dismissed as not maintainable.’

7. The second proviso to sub-Section (5) of Section 21 of the Act of 2008 makes it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply in a case where the appeal is