IMPORTANT POINT
The discretion to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised with care and caution, and there must be objective satisfaction regarding sufficient cause to condone the delay.

JUDGMENT :

1. This appeal is barred by limitation of 781 days.

2. Heard the parties on application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

3. The background of the case is that respondent No.3, Ramdayal had brought Civil Original Suit No.49/2012 against other respondents claiming a decree of permanent injunction. The trial Court decreed the suit by judgment and decree dated 08.05.2014. Appellant Manak Chand Soni was not a party to the suit, however, appellant filed an application under Section 151 CPC for permission of the Court to file appeal against the judgment and decree dated 08.05.2014 passed in Civil Original Suit No.49/2012. The same was registered as Appeal Decree Case No.24/2017 and by the impugned order dated 23.09.2019, the learned 1st Appellate Court rejected the prayer for permission to file appeal. The said prayer was barred by limitation. Hence, the application was dismissed with cost of Rs.2,000/-. The appellant is aggrieved by refusal of leave to appeal.

4. When it was brought to the notice of the Bar that a second appeal would not be maintainable against the aforesaid order of refusal of leave to appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant drew attention of the Court that by the same order, the learned Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Judge.

5. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the appellant has stated that the appellant was having no knowledge about the limitation period, which is prescribed in the Statute, to prefer an appeal before the Hon’ble Court, coupled with the fact that economic condition of the appellant was not good enough to file the present appeal within prescribed time.

6. Ignorance of law is no excuse.

7. So far claim of poor economic condition is concerned, nothing is mentioned in the petition that the appellant had taken any recourse to legal aid etc., therefore, evidently the application appears to contain no sufficient and satisfactory explanation for the delay.

8. Identical issue was there before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Majji Sannemma vs. Reddy Sridevi and Ors. reported in AIR 2022 SC 332 wherein the High Court in a second appeal had condoned the delay of 1011 days. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the past judgments and set aside the order of the High Court condoning delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has quoted earlier observations in the matter of condonation of delay from Para Nos.7.1 to 7.5 which are being reproduced below :

“7.1 In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in (1962) 2 SCR 762, it is observed and held as under:

In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fi