The court upheld the imposition of a 20% pre-deposit condition pending appeal under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, emphasizing its necessity for expediting resolutions in cheque dishonour cases.

ORDER :

(Sameer Jain, J.)

The instant petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the order impugned dated 21.06.2023, passed by the learned court below, whereby a condition of deposition of 20% of the amount of conviction was imposed upon the petitioner, pending appeal.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the complainant-respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonour of a cheque of Rs. 25,00,000/-. Thereafter, the learned trial court, having taken cognizance of the matter and hearing both the sides/scanning the record, convicted and sentenced the petitioner to two years simple imprisonment along with compensation to the tune of Rs. 50 lacs. It is further submitted that the petitioner being aggrieved of the said order, preferred an appeal before the appellate court, which vide order impugned dated 21.06.2023, directed the petitioner to deposit 20% amount of the conviction order within a period of 60 days, pending appeal against the conviction. In this background, being aggrieved of the order impugned mandating the deposition of 20% of the conviction amount, learned counsel has filed the instant petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing and setting aside of order impugned dated 21.06.2023.

3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the condition of pre-deposit of 20% amount shall tantamount to deprivation of the petitioner's right of statutory appeal. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the view taken by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1463/2021 titled as Asim Narang v. M/s Ginni International Ltd. and the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as enunciated in Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors.: Criminal Appeal No. 2741 of 2023. To further elucidate upon his claim, learned counsel averred that no debt liability arises upon the petitioner as the petitioner had taken debt of only 4 lac rupees, against which the petitioner had furnished over 10 cheques as security, but the respondent-complainant reflected/filled up an exaggerated amount, exceeding the admitted debt of 4 lac rupees, out of which 3 lac rupees have already been returned. Lastly, whilst praying for the quashing of the condition of deposit of 20% conviction amount, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that under section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the said condition of pre-deposit is not mandatory in nature and the same can be exempted in extra-ordinary circumstances, including financial hardship.

4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has relied upon the order impugned dated 21.06.2023 and has submitted that the condition of pre-deposit of 20% amount is in consonance with section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and therefore, no interference with the order impugned is called for.

5. Heard learned counsel for the both the sides and scanned the record of the instant petition.

6. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to take note of section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is reproduced herein-under:-

148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent. of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:

Provided that the amount payable under this sub-section shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143A.

(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being s