Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant contempt petition has been filed complaining that the order, passed by this Court on 5.7.1993 in Writ Petition No. 2211/1993, has not been complied with by the respondents.

(2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner had filed a writ petition for issuing direction to the respondents claiming promotion to the post of Lower Division Clerk from Class IV Employee on the basis that he possessed the requisite qualification for the post (Prathma from Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad in 1981) and there was a quota for departmental promotion from Class IV Employee to Lower Division Clerk. This Court disposed of the said writ petition vide judgment and order dated 5.7.93 directing the respondents to consider his representation for promotion within two months of the presentation of the certified copy of the order. As the matter has not been considered, petitioner has filed the instant petition.

(3). There is an inordinate delay of about six years on the part of the petitioner to move the contempt petition as he filed this petition on 30.7.99.

(4). Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, ``the Act) reads as under:-

``Limitation for action for Contempt. - No Court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

(5). Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid provisions of Sec. 20 that the Act provides for initiation of proceedings and not for institution of proceedings. The Honble Supreme Court, in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court (1), has held that the terminus ad quen for the period of limitation in Sec. 20 of the Act is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiate by the Court. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act deals with filing of a suit, appeal or application within the prescribed period and it certainly does not deal with the taking of cognizance of a matter by the Courts. As it does not deal with the initiation of the proceedings, it cannot be said that the Limitation Act or any provision thereof applies to the contempt proceedings and in view of this, the bar of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act is absolute. Sec. 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Limitation Act via Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act are not applicable to contempt proceedings.

(6). The issue of application of the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was considered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Dinesh Bhai Pareek vs. Kripala Co-operative Housing Society, Ahmedabad & Ors. (2), wherein the Court held that the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any limitation for initiating the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. Sec. 20 of the Act fills up the lacuna and prescribes a period of limitation. The Court observed as under:-

``.... Sec. 20 as such does not contemplate the institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the Act. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a Court on its own motion or otherwise. The fetters which Sec. 20 places on the jurisdiction of the Court is that the Court shall not initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the Court in such proceeding, the question of condoning the delay does not arise. Delay can be condoned in a case where a person who has a right to institute action has approached the Court after the expiry of the period of limitation. Sec. 20 does not contemplate such situation. When the Court initiates contempt proceedings on its own motion, the question of condoning the delay does not arise.

(7). Since Sec. 20 of the Act provides for a condition precedent for

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