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2009 Supreme(Raj) 191
[Citation : RLW 2009(1) RJ 257 (Raj.)]
(Rajasthan High Court)
Jaipur Bench
Ganpat & Ors. Vs. Mangla Ram & Ors. (Chauhan, J.)
HON'BLE R.S. CHAUHAN, J.
Ganpat & Ors.
Versus
Mangla Ram & Ors.
S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.1216 of 1981, decided on 04.02.2009
N.L. Pareek, for Petitioners;
S.K. Bhargava, for Respondents
Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963, Article 120 read with C.P.C., Order 22 Rule 10 — Bringing legal representatives on record after inordinate delay — Scope of reasonableness — Held — Article 120 of Limitation Act can be used as a guideline in order to decide the reasonableness of the time required for doing an act — Limitation Act prescribes ninety days for submission of an application for bringing LRs of the parties who have expired —Application filed after an inordinate delay of five years — Rightly rejected. (Paras 21 & 22)
Writ petition abated.
To decipher the reasonableness of time one can turn to the Limitation Act to see the limitation prescribes by the statute. Although, in the case of Hemraj (supra), this Court has held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to the writ proceeding, but in the case of Puran Singh (supra), Honble Supreme Court has held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act can be used as a guideline in order to decide the reasonableness of the time required for doing of an Act. Limitation Act prescribes ninety days for submission of an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the parties who have expired. Thus, the application should have been filed by the petitioner within three months. However, in the present case, the said application was filed after an inordinate delay of five years. Hence, the application has been filed way beyond the reasonable time.
(Para 21)
ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963] vuq- 120 lifBr fl-iz-la-] vknsk 22 fu;e 10 & vlk/kkj.k foyEc ds ipkr~ fof/kd izfrfuf/k;ksa dks vfHkys[k ij ykuk & rdZ laxrrrk dh O;kfIr & vfHkfu/kkZfjr & vuq- 120 ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dk iz;ksx fdlh —R; dks djus gsrq okafNr le; dh rdZ laxrrk fofufpr djus gsrq ekxZnkZd ds :i esa fd;k tk ldrk gS & ftu i{kdkjksa dk fu/ku gks x;k gS muds fof/kd izfrfuf/k;ksa dks vfHkys[k ij ykus gsrq vkosnu izLrqr djus ds fy, ifjlhek vf/kfu;e uCcs fnu dh vof/k fu/kkZfjr djrk gS & ik¡p o"kZ ds vlk/kkj.k foyEc ds ipkr~ vkosnu nk;j fd;k x;k & fujLr djuk mfpr gSA
;kfpdk dk mikeu gqvkA ¼in la- 21 o 22½
Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—The petitioners have challenged the order dated 06.01.1975 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority ('the RAA' for short), and two orders passed by the Board of Revenue, namely order dated 20.04.1979 and 31.08.1979.
2. The writ petition was filed by the petitioners against Mangla Ram and others in the year 1981. However, during the pendency of the writ petition, Mangla Ram, the respondent No.1, expired in 1983. Despite his death, no application was moved by the petitioners for bringing his legal representatives on record till 07.09.1988. The respondents raised an objection that the application for bringing the legal representatives was inordinately delayed by five years. And yet, no application for condonation of delay had been filed along with the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. Therefore, on 16.05.1996 i.e. after eight years of having filed the application for brining the legal representatives on record, an application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioners. After hearing both the parties, vide judgment dated 24.07.1997, the learned Single Judge dismissed the application and held that the writ petition has abated. Therefore, the writ petition was also dismissed as having abated.
3. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a intra-court appeal, registered as D.B.Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.731/1998, wherein they challenged the judgment dated 24.07.1997. After hearing both the parties, the learned Division Bench, vide its order dated 07th February, 2008, has remanded this case to the learned Single Bench and has framed two points for the consideration of this Bench. The two points are as under:
(1) Whether the ratio indicated in Ram Sumiran (Supra) can be made applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case ?
(2) Whether counsel for the deceased informed the Court about the death of the deceased under Order 22 Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure?
4. Before deciding these two points, it is imperative that the factual matrix of the case be narrated in detail. Admittedly, the petitioners and Mangla Ram were residents of the same village. They had been involved in litigation since 1962. Therefore, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the petitioners knew Mangla Ram as resident of his village. Admittedly, Mangla Ram died in 1983. According to the application dated 16.05.1996, petitioner No.1 came to Jaipur in September, 1986 to enquire about the case from his advocate. The advocate asked petitioner No.1 whether all the parties are alive? Whereupon, the advocate was told that Mangla Ram has expired. According to the said application, the application for bringing the legal representative on record was filed on 07.09.1986. However, a perusal of the application clearly reveals that the said application was in fact filed on 07.09.1988 and not on 07.09.1986. It is also not in dispute that from 1988 till 16.05.1996 no applications had been filed for condonation of delay. For the first time, an application for condonation of delay was filed on 16.05.1996 and that too after the respondents had raised objection about the inordinate delay and about the lack of application for condonation being submitted. It is also admitted that after hearing both the parties vide order dated 24.07.1997, the learned Single Judge dismissed the application for bringing the legal representative on record. A bare perusal of the judgment dated 24.07.1997 clearly reveals that both the facts and law have been discussed in great detail.
5. Mr. N.L. Pareek, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that according to the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumiran & Ors. vs. D.D.C. & Ors. (AIR 1985 Supreme Court 606) considering the illiteracy rampant in the country, people cannot be expected to know that in case a respondent were to die, during the pendency of the writ petition, he needs to be substituted by his legal representative. Therefore,
