ORDER :

FARJAND ALI, J.

1. The present writ petition is directed against the order dated 21.04.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Gram Nyayalay, Kolayat in Criminal Complaint No. 26/2017, whereby cognizance was taken for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and process was issued in the form of a warrant of arrest to secure the presence of the petitioner.

2. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred a criminal revision before the learned District & Sessions Judge, Bikaner and the matter was transferred to the Court of the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-cum-Additional Sessions Judge, Bikaner. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, upon hearing the parties, dismissed the revision petition and affirmed the order of cognizance passed by the Nyayadhikari. Hence, the present writ petition.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have meticulously examined the material available on record.

4. At the very threshold, it becomes imperative to advert to the statutory architecture governing challenges to orders passed by a Nyayadhikari under the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008. Section 33 of the Act provides for appeals in criminal cases and reads thus:

Section 33 – Appeal in Criminal Cases (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force, no appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order of a Gram Nyayalaya except as provided hereunder.

(2) No appeal shall lie where—

(a) an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on such plea;

(b) the Gram Nyayalaya has passed only a sentence of fine not exceeding one thousand rupees.

(3) Subject to sub-section (2), an appeal shall lie from any other judgment, sentence or order of a Gram Nyayalaya to the Court of Session.

(4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of judgment, sentence or order of a Gram Nyayalaya.

(5) The Court of Session may, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, pass such order as it thinks fit and the decision of the Court of Session shall be final.

Interpretation of sub-Sections (3), (4) & 5)

(a) Sub-section (3) of Section 33 constitutes the fulcrum of the appellate framework engrafted within the statute. Subject to the narrowly circumscribed exclusions contained in sub-section (2), it mandates that an appeal shall lie from any other judgment, sentence, or order of a Gram Nyayalaya to the Court of Session. The legislative choice of the phrase “shall lie” is neither casual nor permissive; it is couched in imperative terms, thereby creating a vested and enforceable statutory right. The provision admits of no discretion as to the availability of the remedy nor does it contemplate an alternative procedural substitute.

The expression “any other judgment, sentence or order” is deliberately expansive and comprehensive in amplitude. It manifests a clear legislative intent to encompass within its sweep every determinative pronouncement of the Gram Nyayalaya, save those expressly excluded. By designating the Court of Session as the exclusive appellate forum, the statute not only confers a substantive right but also prescribes the precise judicial channel through which that right must be exercised. The provision thus establishes a structured appellate hierarchy and leaves no interstitial space for the substitution of revisional remedies in place of the expressly conferred appellate jurisdiction.

(b) Sub-section (4) reinforces the disciplined structure of this appellate mechanism by prescribing a limitation period of thirty days from the date of the impugned judgment, sentence, or order. This temporal stipulation is not merely procedural formality; it is an intrinsic component of the legislative design. The establishment of Gram Nyayalayas is animated by the objective of expeditious and accessible justice at the grassr