Delay in review petition condoned under Section 14 Limitation Act, excluding time in bona fide Letters Patent Appeal against Article 227 order dismissed for non-maintainability. Review dismissed for absence of error apparent on record, not permitting merit re-argument.

Judgment :

Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J.

Petitioner seeks review of Jallan Cooperative Agriculture Service Society Ltd. Vs. State of H.P. and Others , CMPMO No. 4101 of 2013, decided on 12.03.2018.

2. Since the review petition suffers from delay of 6 years & 134 days, an application has been moved for condoning the same.

2(i). For seeking condonation of delay, the case set- up by the petitioner is that the judgment in question was rendered against the petitioner on 12.03.2018. Petitioner, within the limitation period, assailed the same by way of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) No.12 of 2018. The aforesaid LPA was admitted and set down for hearing. It was on 01.07.2024, that LPA was dismissed on the ground of being not maintainable against the order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Liberty was reserved to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy in accordance with law. According to the petitioner, he preferred instant Review Petition within the limitation period from the date of dismissal of his LPA. Therefore, delay deserves to be condoned.

2(ii) Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that it was in 1978 that in Ishwar Singh Vs. Smt. Ram Piari and Another , AIR 1978 HP 39, this Court had held that no LPA lies against the orders passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the LPA was not maintainable the day it was filed. Prayer was made for dismissal of the application for condonation of delay.

2(iii) According to the petitioner, he had been bonafidely pursuing the LPA preferred against the judgment in question, whereas, stand of non-applicant/respondent is that the LPA preferred by the petitioner against the order/judgment rendered under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable on the day the LPA was instituted. This was the reason the LPA was finally dismissed as such on 01.07.2024. Therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act that provides exclusion of computation of time spent in pursuing it in a wrong Court will not be attracted.
Heard learned counsel on both sides.

The principles governing exclusion of period spent in bona-fidely pursuing remedies in wrong Court were summed up in Purni Devi & Anr. Vs. Babu Ram & Anr., Civil Appeal No.4633 of 2024 decided on 02.04.2024, as under:-

“16. The Plaintiff has sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169. (3- Judge Bench) and M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58. (2-Judge Bench) wherein it was expounded that the provisions of Section14 of the Limitation Act are to advance the cause of justice and must be interpreted to do so rather than abort proceedings.

25. The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is extracted as under, for ready reference:
“. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. …
…

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

27. On a perusal of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which is also applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it is evident that it carves out an exception excluding the period of limitation when the proceedings are being pursued with due diligence and good faith in a Court “which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it”.
30. The principles pertaining to applicability of , were extensively discussed and summarised by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra), wherein whi