The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for adherence to the principles of natural justice in employment disengagement, emphasizing the need for a detailed enquiry and opportunity for the employee to be heard before termination.

JUDGEMENT/ORDER :

Brief Facts

1. The petitioner has filed the present petition and has sought the following relief in the nature of Writ of Certiorari for quashing:

a. Order No. ACDR/WKS/2011-12/2547, dated 12.10.2011 purportedly issued by respondent No. 3.

b. Order endorsement No. BDOR/2-3, dated 09.04.2012 issued by respondent No. 4, whereby the petitioner has been dis-engaged on the ground of registration of a criminal case.

With

A further writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents 1 to 4 to allow the petitioner to perform the duties as Gram Rozgar Sewak in Panchayat Halqa Sarbagni A and Panchayat Halqa Sarbagni-B.

With

A further direction to respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to release the salary in favour of the petitioner w.e.f. August, 2011 onwards till date and continue to pay in future as well.

2. The brief facts, which lead to the filing of the present case are that the petitioner was appointed and engaged as Gram Rozgar Sevak w.e.f. 15.07.2009 and posted in Panchayat Halqa Sarbagni-A and Panchayat Halqa Sarbagni-B. As per the stand of the petitioner, he was performing his duties entirely to the satisfaction of his superior officers. The further stand of the petitioner is that a false and frivolous FIR No. 174 of 2011 was registered on 28.09.2011 which was wrongly mentioned as 28.07.2011 by the Police Station, Banihal. In the aforesaid FIR, it has been alleged that the petitioner had sold 21 bags of Government Cement to one Sh. Ayaz Ahmed S/o Sh. Abdul Rashid Naik.

3. Further the specific stand of the petitioner is that the Police Station, Banihal has presented a challan against him before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Banihal, which is based on incorrect, false and misconceived grounds. It is submitted that the aforesaid challan was presented against the petitioner and Ayaz Ahmed under Sections 409, 411/34 RPC. It is also submitted by the petitioner that even after the registration of the FIR, he was performing his duties which can be certified by a bare perusal of the attendance register.

4. Mr. R.K.S. Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner argued that on the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner was dis-engaged by virtue of order dated 09.04.2012, which is impugned in the present petition in which it has been alleged that he has sold 30 bags of Government Cement. However, there is discrepancy with regard to the quantity of bags mentioned in the FIR and the impugned order.

5. The brief case of the petitioner is that the order, which is impugned in the present writ petition, is stigmatic as no opportunity of being heard has ever been given to him before passing such an order and, therefore, the same is unconstitutional, illegal and liable to be quashed.

6. Mr. Thakur argued that no show cause notice was ever issued or charge sheet ever framed against the petitioner in respect of the allegations which were leveled in the FIR and no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner to rebut the aforesaid allegations. Learned counsel further submits that no enquiry whatsoever was ever conducted by the respondents before dis-engaging the petitioner from the service on the ground of the alleged misconduct and registration of FIR. He submits that the petitioner has been appointed after proper selection by the Committee headed by the District Development Commissioner, Ramban and, therefore, has a vested right of continuously holding the office and, thus, the respondents, by no such imagination, could have dis-engaged him on the alleged misconduct which has yet to be probed without following the principles of natural justice. He has argued that the petitioner was allowed to continue after his first year of service which expired on 15.07.2010 as his work and conduct was found satisfactory and he continued thereafter.

7. It is the specific stand of the petitioner that in the light of terms and conditions mentioned in the engagement order, it has been emphatically made clear that the service of the p