The date of birth declared by the government servant and accepted by the appointing authority is unalterable except in the case of a clerical error, and there are limitations for seeking rectification of date of birth as per Regulation 35AA.

JUDGMENT :

1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgement and order dated 28th February, 2023, passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Srinagar Bench ("Tribunal") in a TA No. 9063/2020, titled Nazir Ahmad Ganie v. State of J&K & Ors.

2. The Tribunal, by judgement aforementioned, impugned in this petition, has dismissed the petition preferred by the petitioner seeking a direction to the respondents to rectify and correct his date of birth recorded in his service book as 16th March, 1963, instead of 16th March, 1964.

3. The petitioner, as is discernible from perusal of the record on the file, was initially appointed as Orderly in the Directorate of State Motor Garages Department on 26th October, 1985. He joined his services on 28th October, 1985. He was subsequently promoted to the post of Junior Assistant and thereafter to the post of Senior Assistant in the year 1989 and 1997, respectively. At the time of his appointment and joining as Orderly in the Directorate of State Motor Garages, the petitioner had got his date of birth recorded as 16th March, 1963, on the edifice of the Matriculation Certificate issued by the State Board of School Education ("Board" for short). It appears that in the year 1992, as is claimed by the petitioner, an application was filed by him before the Board for correction of his date of birth from 16th March, 1963 to 16th March, 1964.

4. This application, according to petitioner, remained pending till the year 2003, when the Board acceded to his request and issued him a fresh Secondary School Examination Certificate on 7th June, 2003, indicating therein his date of birth as 16th March, 1964. In the same year, the petitioner approached Deputy Director, State Motor Garages, Srinagar, for effecting correction of date of birth in his service book. The correspondence between employer of petitioner and authorities of the Board ensued. The fresh certificate of date of birth issued by the Board in the year 2003, submitted by petitioner, was also got verified from the Board authorities and found genuine. The matter was, thus, referred by Director, State Motor Garages, to the Administrative Department of Transport for appropriate orders.

5. The Administrative Department, after considering the matter, vide its Communication No. TR-34/SMG/2009, dated 22nd February, 2010, declined the request of petitioner for effecting any change as it being not covered under Article 35AA of J&K Civil Services Regulation ("Regulations" for brevity).

6. From the perusal of the documents placed on record by the petitioner it transpires that Director, State Motor Garages, once again submitted the case of petitioner to the Administrative Department for reconsideration. This is apparent from the communication of the Director, State Motor Garages, bearing No. EC-PF-38/5968, dated 14th September, 2011. This, however, did not yield the result that petitioner was expecting as the Administrative Department once again declined his request and iterated its earlier opinion communicated vide letter dated 22nd February, 2010, (supra). This brought the writ petitioner to this Court by way of a writ petition, which was later on transferred to the Tribunal and registered as TA No. 9063/2020. The petition was contested by respondents on multifarious grounds. The Tribunal considered the matter in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in several judgements and concluded that the petition was sans merit, in that the petitioner had approached the respondents for correction of his date of birth belatedly, i.e., after delay of 18 years, albeit he was required to apply for such correction/change of date of birth within six months from the date of issuance of SRO 310-F of 1995, dated 29th November, 1995. It is this judgement of the Tribunal, which is called in question by the petitioner before us in this petition.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on recor