The central legal point established in the judgment is that the refusal of jurisdiction by a civil court should not be easily inferred and must be decided on merits, especially when it involves questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact.

JUDGMENT :

1. As Benjamin Franklin once remarked- "great haste makes great waste", the courts while endeavouring to deliver speedy justice, must never deny justice in overzealousness to dispose cases.

2. Challenge in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in terms of Order XLIII of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('Code' for short) has been thrown to order dated 10.09.2022 propounded by the Court of learned Principal Judge Family Court, Srinagar (hereinafter referred to as 'trial court') in case No. 2782/2022 titled 'Jahangir Iqbal Tantray v. Farmeeda Akhtar', vide which learned trial court has returned the suit fled by the appellant for presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction.

3. Shorn of verbosity, factual matrix of the case set out by the appellant in the trial court is that appellant preferred a suit for declaration and permanent injunction for a decree of declaration that the divorce pronounced by him upon the respondent on 22.04.2022 had attained finality after the expiry of three months period, a decree of declaration declaring that the respondent/defendant has no right or claim in the landed property measuring 21 marlas bearing Survey No. 10 (Old 3) Khewat No. 162/157 situate at Mouza Habak Khushki, Srinagar, Kashmir, purchased by him in 2013 after raising loan from the State Bank of India, Srinagar, a decree of declaration declaring that respondent/defendant has no right, claim or interest upon the house situate at Loren Mandi, Poonch, Jammu, constructed by him after raising loan from the J&K Bank, Srinagar, and a decree of permanent prohibitory Injunction restraining the respondent/ defendant from interfering or causing interference into his peaceful and smooth life.

4. The appellant has questioned the impugned order, primarily, on the ground that since parties to the suit are living at Hazratbal Srinagar, the marital dispute between them arose at Srinagar, divorce was also pronounced/communicated upon the respondent/ defendant and the property in question also falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned trial court, therefore, the impugned order is per se illegal, arbitrary, perverse and perfunctory. It is also case of the appellant in the trial court that it has been pleaded and agitated by the respondent/defendant in the application fled by her under section 12 of the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act that divorce has taken place in Srinagar, therefore, suit fled by the appellant could not be returned for want of jurisdiction.

5. The respondent despite service did not choose to appear and, accordingly, is set ex-parte.

6. It is trite position of law that in dealing with the subject, whether a civil court's jurisdiction to analyze a suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind that every opinion should be made in support of the jurisdiction of a civil court. The refusal of jurisdiction, rejection of plaint or return thereof by a civil court to entertain civil causes should not be easily inferred unless the appropriate law contains express terms to that effect or points to a significant and inevitable implication of nature.

7. In order to appreciate the contours of controversy in the right perspective, we need to analyse some indispensable provisions of the Code. Section 9 of the Code makes it clear that Courts, subject to other provisions of the Code, shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except those whose cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Sub-section (1) of Section 26 stipulates that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Section 27 deals with the issuance of summons to the defendants and it provides that where a suit has been 'duly instituted', a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and may be served in the manner prescribed etc. Section 33 of the Code postulates that the Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment and