The main legal point established in the judgment is that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is limited to the recovery of money due to a Workman from the employer and does not extend to passing interim orders or deciding the validity of dismissal.

JUDGMENT :

1) The petitioner has challenged order dated 22.09.2021 passed by J&K Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, whereby order of dismissal dated 30.01.2019 passed by the petitioner against respondent No.2 has been kept in abeyance till the disposal of the main petition.

2) It appears that respondent No.2, who was working as an Area Manager in the Sales and Marketing Department of the petitioner company, has filed a petition before respondent No.1/Tribunal. In his petition, respondent No.2 has sought the following reliefs:

(i) An order directing the OPs to pay salary and other emoluments /benefits in arrears in favour of the petitioner/complainant together with the interests @18% from the date it fell due till its final realization.

(ii) An order directing the OPS not to harass or change the service conditions or deprive the complainant /petitioner from his employment against the mandate of ID Act, Perks and expenses and allowances and other privileges for which he qualifies.

(iii) An order directing the OPs to release salary and expenses already in arrears with the OPS in favour of petitioner/complainant forthwith.

(iv) An any other order/s hereon as it may deem fit and proper

3) The petitioner company has filed its reply to the petition filed by respondent No.2, in which it has disputed the status of respondent No.2 as a Workman and has also disputed his entitlement to the dues claimed by him.

4) It appears that the petition filed by respondent No.2 before respondent No.1/Tribunal was dismissed for non-prosecution on 20.12.2017 and thereafter it was restored to its original number on 14.03.2019. During the interregnum, the petitioner company passed order dated 30.01.2019, whereby services of respondent No.2 were terminated. An interim application came to be filed by respondent No.2 before the Tribunal for quashment of order dated 30.01.2019. Reply to the said application was filed by the petitioner whereafter the impugned order came to be passed by the Tribunal whereby the order of dismissal dated 30.01.2019 was kept in abeyance.

5) The petitioner has challenged the impugned order, primarily, on the ground that the petition that was filed by respondent No.2 before the Tribunal was in the nature of an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) as such, the impugned order could not have been passed by the Tribunal in such proceedings. It has been contended that the order passed by the learned Tribunal is without jurisdiction. It has also been contended that the impugned order does not disclose any reasons and, as such, the same is bad in law. The petitioner has also contended that without deciding as to whether status of respondent No.2 is that of a Workman as defined under the provisions of the Act, no relief could have been granted by the Tribunal in favour of the said respondent.

6) Respondent No.2 has resisted the writ petition mainly on the ground that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is an interim order and the same cannot be challenged by way of writ proceedings. It has been further contended that respondent No.2 has a prima facie case in his favour and, as such, the learned Tribunal was well within its powers to pass the impugned order so as to save respondent No.2 from the vagrancy on account of withholding of his dues by the petitioner company.

7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case.

8) The moot question that falls for determination in this case is whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to stay the dismissal of respondent No.2 in the proceeding that was pending before it. As is clear from the nature of reliefs prayed by respondent No.2 before the Tribunal, the petition filed by the said respondent is in the nature of an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act. This is clear from the fact that respondent No.2 is seeking recovery of alleged dues from the petitioner company. The matter regarding the nature