1. Parties in these proceedings will be referred to according to their rank before the trial court.

2. O.S. No. 1320 of 1980 was filed by the respondents in the Second Appeal, for recovery of possession after terminating the lease. The property belonged to a temple, over which, the plaintiffs have got a leasehold right. The same is sub-leased to the defendant/appellant in the Second Appeal. The suit was filed, after terminating the tenancy.

3. In the written statement filed by the defendant, she claimed only the benefit of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as CTP Act). The defendant said that under S. 9, she is entitled to purchase the right of the landlord, since she has put up the superstructure over the same.

4. On the above pleadings, the parties went to trial. The trial court, as per the judgment dated 23.9.1983, dismissed the suit. It also came to the conclusion that the defendant is also not entitled to the benefits of CTP Act.

5. The plaintiffs preferred A.S. No. 748 of 1985. The defendant also wanted to file an appeal against the dismissal of her application under S. 9 of the CTP Act, as an appeal is provided under that Act. By the time she preferred an appeal as C.M.A., there was already a delay of 892 days and she filed an application for condonation of the delay as C.M.P. No. 1138 of 1986 in Unnumbered C.M.A. S.R. No. 2638. The lower appellate court dismissed that application refusing to condone the delay of 892 days in filing the C.M.A. S.R. No. 2638. Against the dismissal of C.M.P. No. 1138 of 1986, a revision was taken to this Court in C.R.P. S.R. No. 67811 of 1987. As there was also a delay in filing the C.R.P. S.R. No. 67811 of 1987, C.M.P. No. 7590 of 1988 was filed and that petition as well as the C.R.P. S.R. No. 67811 of 1987 were dismissed by this Court on 24.11.1988. Since the petition to condone the delay in preferring the C.M.A. was dismissed, the Unnumbered C.M.A. S.R. No. 2638 of 1986 was also rejected.

6. A.S. No. 748 of 1985 was heard and the appeal was allowed. The lower appellate court held that since the defendant is not entitled to claim the benefits of S. 9 of CTP Act, there is no impediment in granting relief for recovery of possession of the property. It is against the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court, the defendant has filed S.A. No. 212 of 1988. Plaintiffs have preferred Cross Objection No. 8 of 1995 with respect to the ownership of superstructure in the suit property.

7. After the disposal of A.S. No. 748 of 1985, the defendant seems to have filed an application to restore her copy application, so as to enable her to file an appeal against the judgment disallowing the benefits of S. 9, CTP Act to her. That application was dismissed by the trial court. The matter was taken in revision before this Court. This Court allowed the revision and restored the copy application to file. After restoration of the copy application, the defendant obtained a certified copy of the order in I.A. No. 19122 of 1980 once again and preferred C.M.A. No. 156 of 1989. That C.M.A. was heard long after the judgment in A.S. No. 748 of 1985. C.M.A. No. 156 of 1989 was allowed and the defendant was allowed to purchase the site. Against the judgment in C.M.A. No. 156 of 1989, the plaintiffs have preferred C.R.P. No. 2618 of 1990.

8. In the Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law have been raised.

1. Whether the suit or appeal is maintainable when the statement in the plaint as well as in the appeal grounds, clearly says that the plaintiffs are the owners of the super-structure and land?

2. Whether by virtue of G.O. 2000, recovery of possession of the suit property can be claimed in City Civil Court, as the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is ousted even though the suit is filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant in respect of a hut which does not belong to any public religious institution?

9. When the Civil Revision Petition came up for