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2000 Supreme(Mad) 821

High Court of Judicature at Madras
K. SAMPATH
M. Annamalai & Others
Versus
Nattukottai Nagaratiar Oyamadan, Thiruvannamalai by its Trustee, Annamalai Chettiar represented by power of Attorney Agent, K.T. Alagappa Chettiar
Second Appeal No. 105 of 1988
Decided On :Decided On : 18-08-2000

Advocates Appeared:
T.G. Balachandran, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mrs. Pushpa Sathyanarayanan & T.R. Rajaraman Advocates for the Respondents.

Headnote:

City Tenants Protection Act - Setting aside earlier decree - Section 9(1)(a), Section 10(2) - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the applicability of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, particularly focusing on Section 9(1)(a) and Section 10(2) which provide for the rights of tenants and the procedure for seeking relief under the Act. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of the provisions and their impact on the validity of the earlier decree.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiffs filed a suit to set aside an earlier decree obtained by the respondent for recovery of possession. The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, and sought a direction to the respondent to sell the property to them at a price fixed by the Court. The respondent resisted the suit, arguing that the plaintiffs had waived their rights and that the earlier decree was valid.

Finding of the Court:

The trial Court decreed the suit, holding that the earlier decree was a nullity due to the failure to invoke the provisions of the Act. However, the lower Appellate Court reversed this decision, setting aside the decree and dismissing the suit. The Second Appeal was filed against this decision.

Issues: The substantial questions of law raised for decision in the Second Appeal were: 1) Whether the compromise decree in the earlier suit was brought about by the landlords suppressing the availability of the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act, and 2) Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 12 of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the earlier decree was a nullity as the suit itself was not maintainable due to the mandatory requirements of the Act not being complied with. The court emphasized the intentional relinquishment of rights and the lack of knowledge of the Act's provisions by the appellants, concluding that the compromise decree was a nullity.

Final Decision: The judgment and the decree of the lower Appellate Court were set aside, and those of the trial Court were restored in favor of the appellants.

Judgment :-

1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 2957/79 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai, appellants 1 to 3 in the Second Appeal, filed the said suit for setting aside an earlier decree and judgment passed in O.S. No. 2/77 dated 20.9.1997 filed by the respondent herein against them on the following averments:

The respondent herein originally leased out the schedule mentioned property in favour of the plaintiff under a registered lease deed dated 30.11.1972. They put up a superstructure with their own expense. They had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- as tenants for their residential purposes. The superstructure had been assessed separately in their names by the Municipality. They had been paying the property tax regularly as well as the electricity bills and municipal water tax. Though the period fixed under the lease agreement was two years, they continued even after the expiry of the lease period by holding over. While the respondent filed suit O.S. No. 2/77 before the District Munsifs Court, Tiruvannamalai, for recovery of possession against them. The counsel, who appeared for them in the said suit, omitted to invoke the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). If only he had filed the necessary application under Section 9(1) (a) (i) of the Act, there would have been a direction to the respondent to sell the site to them for the price fixed by the Court. As the counsel was not aware of the extension of the provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai Municipal Town, the point was not raised in the written statement filed in that suit. The suit was decreed on 20.9.1977 as a result of a compromise between the parties. On the strength of the decree, the respondent filed R.E.P. No. 334/79 in that suit for delivery.

At this stage, the plaintiffs filed an application under Section 9 (1) (a) and Section 10(2) of the Act for a direction to the respondent to sell the property to them at a price fixed by the Court. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also was filed along with the application under Section 9(1) (a)

(i). Yet another application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed to restore the suit, so that the plaintiffs could invoke the benefits of the Act. All the three applications were dismissed by the Executing Court. They filed C.R.P. No. 2647/79, which was dismissed on 15.11.1979 by this Court with an observation that if they were aggrieved by the decree on the ground that the compromise memo was entered into without their being aware of the extension of the Act to the area where the suit property was situate, then the proper course for them was to file a suit to have the compromise decree set aside and not by means of an application to restore the suit. The earlier decree would not have been passed if only the Court had been apprised of the legal position and the extension of the provisions of the Act to Tiruvannamalai Municipal Town. Failure to bring this legal position to the notice of the Court resulted in miscarriage of justice and the same had to be remedied. The compromise was hit by Section 12 of the Act. There could not be a contract contrary to the provisions of the Act and there was no estoppel against a statute. The plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits of the Act in spite of the decree passed in O.S. No. 2/77. Again, the plaintiffs had paid the rent upto 13.12.1979 and obtained a receipt from the respondent from the suit premises. In that view of the matter, the respondent had waived its rights accrued under the earlier decree. In fact, an advance amount of Rs. 400/- was with the respondent. It was therefore estopped by its conduct from contending that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefits of the Act. The present suit to set aside the earlier decree was filed in time.

2. The respondent resisted the suit contending inter alia as follows;

The pl























































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