IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
N. Anand Venkatesh, J.
Dr. P. Pathmanathan & Others – Petitioners
Versus
V. Monica & Another – Respondents
Crl.OP Nos.28458, 16411, 33643 of 2019, Crl.OP.Nos. 16389, 16450, 17156, 19918, 20434 of 2020 & Crl.OP.Nos. 45, 73, 138, 184, 191, 213, 216, 233, 243, 332 & 349 of 2021 & Crl.MP.Nos. 8239, 8240, 18568, 18569, 15188, 15189 of 2019, 6300, 6302, 6345, 6344, 6641 8174 8562 of 2020, 31, 32, 38, 39, 57, 70, 74, 99, 76, 78, 96, 95, 97, 98, 110, 113, 114, 171 & 172 of 2021
Decided On : 18-01-2021
The Court held that an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act) is not a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C). Therefore, the procedure set out in Sections 190(1)(a) & 200 to 204, Cr.P.C as regards cases instituted on a complaint has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act. The Court also held that a petition to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is maintainable only by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and not under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
Fact of the Case:
The issue that falls for consideration in these batch of cases relates to the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “D.V. Act” or “the Act”) in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.” or “the Code”).
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the proceedings before a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV is not a criminal proceeding before a Criminal Court, and therefore, a petition under Section 482 of the Code would not lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
Issues: 1. Whether a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C would lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act? 2. Whether the proceedings before a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV is a criminal proceeding before a Criminal Court?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the proceedings before a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Chapter IV is not a criminal proceeding before a Criminal Court, and therefore, a petition under Section 482 of the Code would not lie to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. 2. The Court held that an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is not a complaint under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. Consequently, the procedure set out in Section 190(1)(a) & 200 to 204, Cr.P.C as regards cases instituted on a complaint has no application to a proceeding under the D.V Act.
Final Decision: The Court held that a petition to quash an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is maintainable only by way of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and not under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
ORDER :
(Prayer in Crl OP No.28458 of 2019 : Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.PC., to call for the records in D.V.No.71 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Mahila Court at Krisnnagiri, quash the proceedings therein in as far as the petitioners herein are concerned.)
The issue that falls for consideration in these batch of cases relates to the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “D.V. Act” or “the Act”) in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.” or “the Code”).
2. This Court had directed the Registry to put up a number of cases filed between 2017 and 2020, and pending, for quashing applications under Section 12 of the D.V Act. This Court was surprised to learn that over 1000 such cases were pending. The D.V Act endeavors the Magistrate to dispose an application filed under Section 12 (1) within 60 days from the date of its first hearing. However, here is a distressing scenario where the proceedings, in a majority of the cases, have come to a grinding halt without any progress for more than 3 years on account of the pendency of the petitions on the file of this Court.
3. Upon a close reading of the D.V Act, this Court found that the nature of rights that were protected and enforced under the Act were purely civil in nature. However, considering the forum which was dealing with such applications, and the procedure adopted, a criminal color has been unwittingly given to these proceedings. Like a chameleon changing its colour depending on the situation, the proceedings under the D.V Act were also camouflaged due to the nature of the forum provided under the Act.
4. On the flip side, this faulty understanding of the nature of the proceedings has also given rise to a tendency to misuse these proceedings as a weapon of harassment against parties who are unrelated to the proceedings by making them stand before a Magistrate like accused persons. It is mainly on account of this abuse of process that a deluge of petitions came to be filed for quashing the proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. This sorry state of affairs was a clear clarion call that impelled this Court to undertake this exercise to bring the situation under control by laying down certain guidelines for the disposal of the applications under Section 12 of the D.V Act.
5. Considering the importance of the issue involved, this Court sought for and obtained the assistance of the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, and the senior members of the Bar who have made their respective submissions. This Court was provided with able assistance by the respective learned counsel in order to enable this Court to fully answer the various issues that have cropped up in these cases.
6. A brief excurse into the provisions of the D.V. Act is necessary to set the discussion in context. Domestic violence against women is a human rights and social rights issue that has engaged the attention of law and policy makers at global and national levels. The genesis of the D.V Act can be traced to the General Recommendation XII (1989) passed by the U.N Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Taking note of Articles 2, 5, 11, 12 and 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), it was unanimously resolved by the Committee that State parties must put in place appropriate legislations to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other area of social life. India ratified the CEDAW in 1993. However, a legislation to implement General Recommendation XII had to await another 12 years.
7. On account of the collective efforts of several national and international women’s organisations and the National Commission for Women, the Protection from Domestic Violence Bill, 2002
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