( 1 ) THIS is an application, purporting to be under Order 45, Rule 13, C. P. C. , for the issue of an order staying operation of the order passed by this Court on October 8, 1956, in Writ Petition no. 252 of 1956 and maintaining the status quo as regards possession over the land covered by the orders of the consolidation authorities. The facts leading to this application are as follows:

( 2 ) UNDER Section 26 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (No. 5 of 1954) possession of some land belonging to opposite parties Nos. 1 to 11 was transferred to other tenants of the village, who are opposite parties 12 to 16. After exhausting the remedy as provided in the Act against the transfer they filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, Mukhtar Singh v. State of U. P. , Petn. No. 252 of 1956: (AIR 1957 All 297) (A ). A Bench of this Court quashed the orders of the consolidation authorities regarding transfer of possession of the Opposite parties land on 8th October, 1956 on the ground that Section 14 (ee) of the Act was unconstitutional. The State of U. P. has filed an application "for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court" and the application is pending. Opposite parties Nos. 1 to 11 are trying to get back possession over their land on which crops have been sown by opposite parties 12 to 16 after possession was transferred by the consolidation authorities. The State apprehends that a grave situation would arise if the status quo were not maintained and if the opposite parties 1 to 11 were allowed to take back possession from opposite parties 12 to 16; therefore, it asks for stay of the operation of the order passed by the Bench on 8-10-1956. The application is contested by opposite parties 1 to 11; who contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to stay the operation of the order either under Order 45, Rule 13, C. P. C. , or under any other law.

( 3 ) BEFORE deciding whether we have any jurisdiction to stay the operation of the order passed by this Court it is essential to determine what proceeding is pending before us, because our jurisdiction depends upon its nature. The proceeding is undoubtedly one connected with an appeal desired to be preferred by the applicant to the Supreme Court from the Courts order. Under Article 132 an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any final order of a High Court "whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding", if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Where the High Court has refused to give a certificate, the Supreme Court may grant special leave to appeal. Where such a certificate is given or such leave is granted, any party in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that such question has been wrongly decided and, with the leave of the Supreme Court, on any other ground. Three facts emerge from these provisions of Article 132 (1) that proceedings are divisible into three classes, "civil", "criminal" and "other" proceedings, (2) that the appeal must be filed after the certificate is given by the High Court and not before; and (3) that it must be filed in the Supreme Court and not in the High Court. The grounds of appeal may, with the leave of the Supreme Court, include grounds other than that the question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution has been wrongly decided; it follows that they are expected to be prepared after the certificate is given or the leave is granted. If the appellant wants to appeal on any other ground, he must after receiving the certificate from the High Court or the special leave from the Supreme Court obtain the leave of the Supreme Court for the same. Article 133 provides that "an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court" if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; but no appeal shall He from the judgm