The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'seasonal factory' under Section 2 (19-A) of the ESI Act, particularly in relation to the manufacturing processes of coffee, blending, and packing, and the impact of the amendment on the exclusion of certain manufacturing activities from the ESI Act.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, callilng for the records of the respondent in proceedings No.63000466860000008/MEC/SRO/SLM and quash its order dated 25.03.2014.)

The order issued under Section 45-A of the Employees Insurance Act, 1948 (As Amended) [hereinafter referred to as the 'ESI Act, 1948, in short], is under challenge in the present writ petition.

2. The writ petitioner, namely, Hindustan Uniliver Ltd., is a Company and they are in the process of manufacturing 'Conventional and Instant Coffee' under the brand name of M/s.Brooke Bond India Ltd.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Company contended that the order impugned and the reasonings furnished for arriving a conclusion is not in consonance with the provisions of the ESI Act, 1948 (As Amended). The only reason attributed for bringing the establishment under the cover of ESI Act, is that the petitioner-Company is having a Canteen with employees and security personnel in the factory and those employees are governed under the ESI Act and therefore, the entire establishment is to be covered. Such a reasoning is untenable in view of the 'Exclusion Clause', which is in favour of the petitioner-Company.

4. In order to substantiate the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court with reference to Section 2 (19-A) of the ESI Act, 1948. The petitioner-Company is falling under the definition of 'Seasonal Factory' as they are the manufacturers of Coffee. The petitioner-Company has established that they are the manufacturers of Coffee and falling under the 'Exclusion Clause' contemplated under Section 2 (19-A) of the ESI Act and therefore, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.

5. With reference to the Amendment, the learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the petitioner-Company has not involved in any process of blending or packing and therefore, they are not falling under the expanded Amended Clause of Section 2 (19-A) of the ESI Act, 1948. Thus the order impugned is liable to be set aside.

6. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation vs. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and Sons and Another [1992 (1) LLJ 287], wherein it has been held in paragraph-7 with regard to the Amendment issued to Section 2 (19), which reads as under:-

“7. The view taken by the High Court seems to be justified. The statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which later became the Act 44 of 1966 indicates that the proposed amendment was to bring within the scope of the definition of ‘seasonal factory’, a factory which works for a period of not exceeding seven months in a year- (a) in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee; or (b) in such other manufacturing process as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. The amendment therefore, was clearly in favour of the widening the definition of ‘seasonal factory’. The amendment is in the nature of expansion of the original definition as it is clear from the use of the words ‘include a factory’. The amendment does not restrict the original definition of “seasonal factory” but makes addition thereto by inclusion. The word “include” in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension, and not with restriction. The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares tha