Disputed facts cannot be adjudicated under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the regularisation of service should commence from the date of appointment.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer: W.P. No.8650 of 2014: filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records relating to the award passed by the 2nd respondent, viz., Principal Labour Court, Vellore, made in Computation Petition No.215 of 2007 dated 31.08.2010 and quash the same.

W.P. No.29174 of 2016: filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records relating to the award passed by the 2nd respondent, viz., Principal Labour Court, Vellore, made in Computation Petition No.215 of 2007 dated 31.08.2010 and quash the same.)

1. Assailing the order passed by the Addl. Labour Court ordering the petitions filed u/s 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and directing the petitioner to pay the monetary amount, as quantified in the said petitions therein, the present writ petitions have been filed.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that the 1st respondent in W.P. No.8650/14, since deceased (for brevity, will be referred to as ‘workman), was employed as a contract labour from 1980 and worked under the petitioner till 3.2.1998. Thereafter, his services were regularised as per the orders of the Supreme Court from 3.3.1998. Subsequently, the petitioner attained superannuation and retired on 31.8.2007.

3. It is the case of the workman that he was engaged a contract labourer by the Labour Contractor, who was engaged by the Junior Engineer of the petitioner and payments towards his salary was paid by the petitioner and, therefore, the workman is an employee under the petitioner. It is the further case of the workman that the Standing Orders of the petitioner clearly stipulates that any casual labour, who had worked 240 days in a period of 12 calendar months shall be deemed to be a temporary workman and of the Board and, therefore, the workman having put in the said service, his service from 1980 to 3.2.1998 shall be treated as temporary service, which should be taken for the purpose of calculation of pension.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that persons, who had completed more than 10 years of service excluding nominal muster roll and temporary casual labourer service, shall have the said period calculated for the purpose of computing pensionary benefits under the regular work establishment, as provided for in Memorandum (P) No.7588/N1/881- (SB) dated 11.7.1998 and as per (Pe) B.P. No.124 (SB) dated 30.12.1992 as well as B.P. Ms. (FB) No.5 (Audit Br.) dated 26.06.1986. However, the workman was selected on the basis of the Justice Khalid Commission and joined as Helper on 3.3.1998 forenoon and the total service rendered by the workman is only 9 years 5 months and 29 days. Therefore, the question of payment of pension does not arise in line with the aforesaid proceedings of the Board.

5. Therefore, upon superannuation, since the claim of the workman for pension was negatived. Hence, the workman filed C.P. No.215/2007 claiming arrears of pension for the period from 1980 to 3.2.1998 and C.P. No.254/2013 for the period 1.9.2007 to 30.6.2013 and the Addl. Labour Court, without properly appreciating the materials available on record, had passed the impugned order directing payment of pension to the workman and, accordingly directed computation of arrears of pension, to be paid to the workman. Aggrieved by the said orders, the present petitions are filed.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when the issue pertains to disputed questions, adjudication u/s 33-C (2) of the ID Act is impermissible, as no adjudication could be done under Section 33-C (2). Only insofar as admitted facts are concerned, a petition u/s 33-C (2) would be maintainable. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi – Vs – Ganesh Razak & Anr. (1995 (1) SCC 235), wherein the Supreme Court has held that only with relation to an already a