Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are similar citations from Madras and Supreme Court decisions, referencing the principles discussed:

1. The scope of Section 92 of the Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of oral evidence to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of a written agreement has been considered by the courts, emphasizing that oral evidence is generally inadmissible to alter the terms of a formal written contract, except under specific provisos such as proving fraud, coercion, or a subsequent agreement (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .

2. The courts have clarified that when a document is intended to be a complete and final expression of the parties’ agreement, oral evidence cannot be used to contradict its terms, but evidence related to the existence of a separate oral agreement, or to prove that the written document was not intended to be acted upon, may be admissible under the exceptions outlined in Section 92 of the Evidence Act (!) (!) (!) .

3. The principle that conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances can be considered to determine the true intention behind an agreement, especially when there is a suspicion that a written document was not meant to be acted upon, has been upheld by the courts. This includes examining the timing of payments, demands for performance, and other conduct to assess readiness and willingness (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .

4. The importance of framing proper issues relating to the readiness and willingness of a plaintiff in specific performance cases has been underscored, with courts emphasizing that failure to do so can adversely affect the entitlement to equitable relief. The courts have also reiterated that mere payment of consideration does not automatically establish readiness and willingness (!) (!) (!) .

5. Judicial decisions have reinforced that the delay in demanding performance and the conduct of the parties are relevant factors in assessing whether the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform the contract, which is a necessary condition for granting specific performance (!) (!) (!) .

6. Both the Madras High Court and Supreme Court have consistently held that the burden of proving that an agreement was not intended to be acted upon rests on the party asserting that the document was a sham or executed merely as security, and that surrounding circumstances and conduct are critical in such determinations (!) (!) (!) .

7. The courts have also emphasized that the existence of a formal written agreement, coupled with conduct indicating otherwise, can lead to the conclusion that the agreement was not intended to be acted upon, especially when the consideration paid is significantly below the market value, or when there are unexplained delays in demanding performance (!) (!) (!) .

These principles reflect the consistent judicial approach in both Madras and Supreme Court decisions regarding the interpretation of written agreements, the admissibility of oral evidence, and the assessment of readiness and willingness in specific performance cases.