Departmental action for the same set of charges cannot be legally sustained after the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal charges.

ORDER :

PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, seeking Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records culminating in the order initiating departmental proceedings dated 04.04.2022 bearing Memo No.2450/418/Admo/Adm.B/B2/F.enquiry/2022 being the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent and quash the same and direct the 2nd respondent to reinstate the petitioner and consequently award back his wages for the period 12.02.2009 till date.

For an incident that occurred on 12.02.2009 alleging that the petitioner had accepted and demanded bribe from one V.S. Varadharajan, he was subjected to criminal prosecution in Crime No.32009/AC/HQ for offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. The criminal case culminated into CC No.98 of 2011 before the Special Court for cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai and by a judgement dated 17.02.2022, the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal charge. Thereafter, through the impugned charge memo dated 04.02.2022, charges have been framed for the same incident that was the subject matter of criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

2. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when the departmental action for the same set of charges and the charges before the Criminal Court are one and the same, more particularly when the petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal charges, the departmental proceedings cannot be proceeded with, in view of various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as well as this Court. In support of such statement, he placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of [D.Sridhar Vs.TANGEDCO and others] in WP No.18781 of 2018 dated 27.09.2021.

3. Per contra, the learned Standing counsel for TANGEDCO submitted that there is no impediment for the departmental action and the criminal case to be parallely proceeded with, as held in various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. According to him, even though the petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal charges, the department is well within its power to initiate departmental action since the mode of consideration of the evidence in both these cases are different.

4. I have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the respective counsels.

5. The order of acquittal passed by the criminal Court dated 17.02.2023 has been produced before this Court. A perusal of the same, reveals that the facts of the prosecution case therein are exactly that of the same delinquency that has been attributed to the petitioner herein through the impugned charge memo. Both of them relate to the incident of demand and bribe by the petitioner on 12.02.2009. In D.Sridhar case stated supra, I had the occasion of analysing the validity of a charge memo where the delinquency is based on the criminal charges for which an employee of TANGEDCO was tried and acquitted. By placing reliance on certain decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court, I had held that such departmental action, for the same set of charges, cannot be legally sustained. The relevant portions of the order is as follows :-

9. However, the issue that arises for consideration in the present case is as to whether the respondents can initiate departmental proceedings on the same set of charges for which the employee was tried and acquitted by the Criminal Court, particularly, after lapse of almost 11 years. The issue has been answered in favour of the petitioner herein in the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in G.M.Tank’s case (supra), wherein, such an initiation of the departmental action was held to be impermissible. The relevant portion of the order reads as follows:-

In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appella