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2025 Supreme(Mad) 3080

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J
M. Satheesh - Appellant
Versus
Teachers Recruitment Board - Respondent
W.P. No. 9314 of 2025, W.M.P. Nos. 10457, 10458 of 2025
Decided On : 18-03-2025

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : S.N. Ravichandran
For the Respondents: K. Sathish Kumar, C. Jaya Prakash

The court upheld the age limit of 40 years for Assistant Professor positions, emphasizing adherence to established guidelines to prevent arbitrariness and ensure equality in public employment.

Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 16 - Writ Petition challenging age limit for Assistant Professor (Pre Law) - Maximum age limit set at 40 years with a provision for a 5-year extension for teaching experience - Petitioner argued that the age limit is arbitrary and discriminatory - Court held that the age limit is consistent with prior judgments and guidelines, emphasizing the need for equality and non-arbitrariness in state action. (Paras 1, 3, 10, 20)

(B) Equality and Non-Arbitrariness - The principles of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 prohibit arbitrary state action and ensure fairness in public employment - The court reiterated that any deviation from established guidelines could lead to arbitrary outcomes. (Paras 3, 20)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner, aged 40 years and 13 days, challenged the age limit set by the Teacher Recruitment Board for the post of Assistant Professor (Pre Law), arguing for relaxation based on prior teaching experience. (Paras 1, 3)

Findings of Court:
The court found no grounds to relax the age limit, stating that adherence to the established guidelines is necessary to avoid arbitrariness and ensure fairness in the recruitment process. (Paras 20, 21)

Issues: The main issues included the legality of the age limit set for the Assistant Professor position and whether the petitioner should be granted an age relaxation based on prior teaching experience. (Paras 1, 20)

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the age limit is a necessary criterion for recruitment and that any relaxation must be consistent with established guidelines to prevent arbitrary decisions. (Paras 20, 21)

Result: Writ Petition dismissed.

ORDER :

1. The Writ Petition has been filed in the nature of a Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the the entire records connected with the impugned Clause 5 a (ii) and (iii) of the Notification No: 01/2025, dated 24.01.2025, issued by the respondent, in so as fixing 40 years as on 01.07.2025 as a maximum age limit to apply to the post of Assistant Professor (Pre Law) and also in so far as denial of benefit of extension of age to the candidates working in Teaching Posts, whether temporary or regular in colleges other than the law colleges alone are concerned and quash the same as arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory and consequently direct the respondent to permit the petitioner to participate in the selection process to the post of Assistant Professor (Pre Law).

2. The petitioner had applied for the post of Assistant Professor (Pre-Law) consequent to notification issued by the 2nd respondent/ Teachers Recruitment Board dated 24.01.2025.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1974) 4 SCC 3 and made specific reference to paragraph No.85, which is as follows:

The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challlenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of 14 and 16. Art. 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that Arts. 14 as there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14. In other words, Art. 14 is the genus while Art 16 is a species, Art. 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Arts. 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose J., "a way of fife", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any ;attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so Would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art. 16. Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action an( ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would :amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of Power and arbitrari

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