The original authority and the Board of Trustees cannot challenge the Tribunal's order without express authorization from the Central Government, affirming the finality of the Tribunal's decisions.

ORDER :

M. Dhandapani, J.

This Writ Petition has been filed seeking qaushment of the order of the Presiding Officer, Employees Provident fund Appellate Tribunal (CGIT) made in EPFA.No.223 of 2018 dated 11.04.2019 insofar as reducing the assessment of damages into 50% under Section 14B of the Act.

2. When the matter is taken up for consideration, it is brought to the notice of this Court that similar issue has been raised in a batch of petitions in W.P.Nos.26413/2017, etc. Batch and this Court, vide order dated 04.08.2023 had allowed the writ petitions setting aside the order passed by the original authority. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the ratio laid down in the aforesaid order would be applicable to the case as well as the order impugned herein has been passed by the Board of Trustees, who is not clothed with power to question the order of the Tribunal.

3. This Court perused the order passed in W.P.Nos.26413/2017, etc. Batch, wherein, this Court has held as under :-

“25. A conjoint reading of Sections 7-I and 7-L shows that an appeal to the Tribunal could be filed only by the person aggrieved by the order of the authority or the Central Government and it cannot be by an authority, even higher in hierarchy to the authority, who had passed the order in the absence of any authorisation by the Central Government. Further, for the purpose of determination of moneys to be recovered, the inquiry by the authority is deemed to be a judicial proceeding as is passed by a civil court. In effect, the order passed by the authority, is a judicial order passed exercising quasi-judicial power.

26. Further, as evidenced above, sub-section (4) of Section 7-L makes the order passed by the Tribunal a finality, which could not be questioned in any court of law. True it is that the order of the Tribunal can be put in issue before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, as this Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction. However, the only interpretation that could be given harmoniously to sub-section (4) of Section 7-L is that the authority, who had passed the order, being an authority lower in hierarchy to the Tribunal, is bound to accept the order passed by the Tribunal and is estopped from questioning the said order by filing appeal, except where the order passed is without jurisdiction and that too only if the authority has proper authorisation from the Central Government.

27. However, the other party to the lis, viz., the individual, cannot be estopped from taking the same on appeal before a higher judicial forum. Meaning thereby, the order passed by the Tribunal in an appeal by the employer, could at best be challenged only by the employer, if it is against the employer and the authority, who passed the original order is bound to act on the basis of the order passed by the Tribunal as the Tribunal is the final arbiter under the statute insofar as the authority is concerned. Further, it should be pointed out that the order passed by the original authority merges with the appellate order and the original authority is bound by the order passed by the appellate authority. Any other construction, if given to Section 7-L (4) would render the appeal remedy an empty formality as every time, the order of the original authority is interfered with by the appellate authority, the original authority, if permitted to rush before the higher judicial forum, including the High Court under Art. 226, then it would defeat the very intent of the Parliament in including Section 7-L (4). Only to put a stop to further litigative process, more specifically by the original authority, sub-section (4) to Section 7-L had put shackles on the original authority by making the order passed by the Tribunal a finality. The order could be challenged by the authority by way of a writ petition only when the authority is clothed with authorisation by the Central Government or Board of Trustee to prefer appeal against the order passed by the appellat