ORDER :

MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, C.J.

1. Heard on the application seeking condonation of delay of 116 days in filing the appeal.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant would submit that the delay occurred as the appellant was indisposed and on recuperation, he promptly filed the appeal.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, referring to the provisions of Section 42 of the Prevention of Money- laundering Act, 2002 [PMLA] would submit the appeal should be filed within 60 days from the date of communication of the order and the said period, on showing sufficient cause, is extendable for a further period not exceeding 60 days. As the appellant failed to file the appeal within the stipulated period and no sufficient cause is shown, the delay in filing cannot be condoned.

4. Before adverting to the merits of the submissions made on either side, it is seemly to reproduce Section 42 of the PMLA hereunder:

“42. Appeal to High Court—

Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order:

Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “High Court” means—

(i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and (ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.”

5. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is luculent that any person aggrieved by the decision of Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal. Proviso to Section 42 of the PMLA postulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. It is, thus, clear that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days and, on showing sufficient cause, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period not exceeding sixty days. The usage of the words “not exceeding sixty days” in the aforesaid proviso, enjoins the High Court from entertaining an appeal filed beyond 120 days.

6. Apropos of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the provisions of PMLA, it is becoming to refer to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under:

“29. Savings.—

(1) ***

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

[emphasis supplied]

7. On a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that where any special or local law prescribes for a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent which they are not expressly excl