Ramesh Chand Malviya, J.—The present Memo of appeal has been filed under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), against the order dated 29.05.2023 passed in Civil Misc. Case No. 44 of 2021 by the Learned District Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram whereby and whereunder the Learned Judge was pleased to dismissed the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act at the admission stage on the ground of limitation without giving benefit under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.

2. This appeal is accompanied by an interlocutory application seeking condonation of delay of 129 days in filing of this appeal. At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the application inadvertently mentions delay of 129 days and the appeal is barred by 60 days. In support of the interlocutory application, learned counsel submits that the delay in filing of the appeal has occurred primarily because the file moves from field to headquarter/department and in the department also files move from the level of Assistant and it reaches up to the level of Joint Secretary/Secretary after crossing various officers. By placing reliance on the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. vs. Kameshwar Pd. Singh and analogous case reported in 2000 (3) PLJR (SC) 81 at para 11;—

“…….. Power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katji & Ors. [1987 (2) SCR 387] held that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice – that being the life purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adapted on principle it is realized that:—

“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand of benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. ‘Every-day's delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? Doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non- deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that, delay is occasionally deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fide. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary respected not an account of its power to legalize injustice to technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so………”

2.i. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that certain amount of latitude within the permissible limit is permissible in case of examining the ‘sufficient cause’ of delay in filing appeal by the State. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandramani and Others reported in 1996 (3) SCC 132, it is noticed that equally the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. It is also observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Spl. Tehsildar Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma that liberal approach appreciating the grounds for delay by the State and meritorious matter may be heard on merit so that cause of justice is not defeated. He therefore, prays that by taking into account of details and considering the policy dec