Rule 33 of the Orissa Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1990, which provides that anything done, any action taken, or orders passed under the repealed rules shall be deemed to have been done, taken, or passed under the 1990 Rules, allows for the imposition of royalty on minor minerals extracted from the leased area in respect of an existing lease at the rates stipulated in Schedule I of the 1990 Rules.

PATRA, J.

( 1 ) A short question that arises for determination in this case is whether royalty is imposable after coming into force of the Orissa Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1990 by invoking Rule 33 thereof in respect of an existing lease granted under the Orissa Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1983.

( 2 ) THE Tahsildar, Dhankanal opposite party No. 2 granted two long term leases (Padmanava Stone Quarries Nos. 1 and 2) to the petitioner vide long term lease cases Nos 6 and 7 of 1990-91 under the Orissa Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1983 Rules' ). Pursuant to such grant the petitioner started operating the quarries in question although no formal lease deeds have been executed. When the matter stood thus, the 1983 Rules came to be repealed and replaced by Orissa Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1990 Rules) by specifying rates of royalty payable in respect of minor minerals in Schedule 1, following the enforcement of the 1990 Rules with effect from 19-8-1990, the petitioner was served with two notices dated 11-1-1991 as per Annexures 7 and 8 calling upon him to deposit the differential royalty which were calculated as per the 1990 Rules in respect of both the quarries. These two notices are the subject matter of challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

( 3 ) THE point involved in this case has recently been decided by this Court in Debasis Singh Samant v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 Orissa 11. It has been held therein that by virtue of Rule 33 of the 1990 Rules which provides that anything done, any action taken or orders passed under the repealed rules shall be deemed to have been done under the 1990 Rules, lease granted under the repealed rules shall be deemed to be a lease under the 1990 Rules and royalty could be levied on minor minerals extracted from the leased area in respect of an existing lease at the rates stipulated in Schedule I of the 1990 Rules.

( 4 ) THE aforesaid decision is directly against the petitioner, Shri Mishra has submitted that the word 'deemed' which creates a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended to its logical end and invited our attention to the cases of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City 1, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroff, AIR 1963 SC 1443; Katikara Chintamani Dora v, Guatreddi Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069; N. Shiva Rao v. Cecilia Pereira, AIR 1987 SC 248; M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, air 1987 SC 1086; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247; and Hakim Ali v. The Board of Revenue, U. P. , AIR 1991 SC 972: (1991 AIR SCW 252 ). It may be noted here that in none of the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner, the meaning and purport of the specific word 'deemed' came up for consideration except in the first three cases where there are observations saying that legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose.

( 5 ) WHENEVER there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1987 (Section 7 of the Orissa General Clauses Act) follow unless a different intention appears. But when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would have to look at the provisions of the new Act whether they indicate different intention. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh, 1955 Cri LJ 254, the Supreme Court observed as follows :"whether there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a. contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new