Acquittal in criminal proceedings may necessitate reinstatement if charges are identical in disciplinary inquiries, establishing that upholding disciplinary actions might be unjust if acquittal stems from a failure of prosecution.

ORDER :

Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.

1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia challenging order dated 24.12.2024 so passed by O.P. No.3 under Annexure-7. Vide the said order, claim of the petitioner for his reinstatement by setting aside the order of discharge passed on 21.03.2007 was rejected.

4. It is contended that petitioner because of his implication in Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.34 dated 18.09.2006, was discharged from his services vide order dated 21.03.2007. However, in the said Vigilance Proceeding, petitioner was acquitted vide judgment dated 18.09.2023 in VGR No.34 of 2006 under Annexure-2.

4.1. It is contended that on his acquittal in the Vigilance proceeding, petitioner when moved O.P. No.3 with a prayer to reinstate him in his service by quashing the order of discharge passed by the Commandant on 21.03.2007, the same was rejected vide the impugned order under dated 24.12.2024 Annexure-7.

4.2. It is contended that since the Vigilance proceeding for which the petitioner was discharged from his services on 21.03.2007, ended in acquittal vide judgment dated 18.09.2023, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Lal Vrs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. /b>. (Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023) so followed in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and Others (Civil Appeal No.5497 of 2025), petitioner is eligible to get the benefit of reinstatement. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-13, 25 and 30 of the decision in the case of Ramlal has held as follows:-

“13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 , State Bank of Hyderabad vs. P. Kata Rao , (2008)15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)]

25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology.

30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable.”

4.3. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh has held as follows:-

“47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan.

50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the informant and PW-2 refused to identify th